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PUTTING SHOULDER PADS ON SCHLECK:
HOW THE BUSINESS OF PROFESSIONAL
CYCLING COULD BE IMPROVED THROUGH
A MORE AMERICAN STRUCTURE
Chris Deubert*
INTRODUCTION

I

t was announced in August 2010 that three-time Tour de France
winner Alberto Contador, less than a week after his latest victory,
was leaving his Kazakhstan-based team, Astana, at the end of the season.1 Contador reportedly rejected a two-year, nearly $13 million deal
from Astana,2 instead choosing to sign with Bjarne Riis’ Danish-based
Saxo Bank-SunGard team for a reported two years and $20 million.3 The
move was particularly notable because Contador was essentially replacing rider Andy Schleck, who announced that at the end of the 2010 season he would be leaving Riis’ squad to form a team based in his native
Luxembourg.4 Schleck finished second to Contador in both the 2009 and
2010 Tours de France, including a controversial thirty-nine second victory in 2010.5
*

J.D./M.B.A., Fordham University School of Law and Graduate School of Business,
New York, NY; B.S., Sport Management, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA.
The author can be reached at cdeubert@gmail.com and he rides a Specialized bicycle. He
would like to thank his fiancée, Erin Gaffey (LeMond bicycle), for inspiring this Article.
1. Alasdair Fotheringham, Contador Quits Astana to Replace Rival Schleck, INDEP.
(U.K.),
Aug.
4,
2010,
at
54,
available
at
http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/general/others/cycling-contador-quits-astana-toreplace-rival-schleck-2042336.html (reporting that Contador turned down approximately
£4.1 million (about $6.3 million) annually); Andrew Hood, Bjarne Riis Signs Alberto
Contador for the 2011 Saxo Bank-Sungard Team, VELO NEWS (Aug. 12, 2010, 5:13 PM),
http://velonews.competitor.com/2010/08/news/riis-signs-contador_132572 [hereinafter
Hood, Riis Signs Contador].
2. Fotheringham, supra note 1.
3. Contador Signs Two-Year Deal with Saxo Bank-SunGard, EL PAÍS (Madrid),
Aug. 4, 2010, at 6.
4. Richard Moore, Cycling: Tour Champion Contador to Replace Schleck at Saxo
Bank, GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 4, 2010, at 7; Ben Atkins, Andy Schleck Confirms Saxo
Bank
Departure,
VELONATION
(July
30,
2010,
10:44
AM),
http://www.velonation.com/News/ID/5070/Andy-Schleck-confirms-Saxo-Bankdeparture-destination-still-to-be-announced.aspx.
5. Contador in Yellow as Schleck Suffers Untimely Mechanical at the Tour.
France’s Voeckler Wins the Stage, VELO NEWS (June 22, 2011, 2:46 PM),
http://velonews.competitor.com/2010/07/news/contador-in-yellow-as-schleck-suffersuntimely-mechanical-at-the-tour-frances-voeckler-wins-the-stage_129933.
Entering
Stage 16 of the 2010 Tour de France, an important mountain stage, Schleck held a thirty-
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While it was not as controversial as Brett Favre forcing his way onto
the Minnesota Vikings6 or Johnny Damon signing with the New York
Yankees,7 just weeks prior to Contador’s signing, anyone who rooted for
Team Saxo Bank8 also ardently rooted against the Spaniard Contador and
Astana. Surely the Saxo Bank fans questioned their loyalty to the team in
light of its signing of Contador. Moreover, by the start of the 2011 season, Contador had brought three former Astana riders with him to Saxo

one second lead over Contador. Juliet Macur, Etiquette Debate Follows Tour De France
Lead Change, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2010, at B.11. However, on a decisive climb that day,
Schleck’s bike chain became dislodged, forcing Schleck to stop and repair it. David Roth,
Contador Wins by One Bike Chain, WALL ST. J. BLOG (July 26, 2010, 10:34 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/dailyfix/2010/07/26/contador-wins-by-the-length-of-one-bike-chain.
While Schleck was forced to stop, Contador rode on, in a move some said was against
unwritten rules not to attack a rider who has stopped through no fault of his own. See id.
Contador took thirty-nine seconds on the stage to take an eight second lead over Schleck.
Id. On the Tour’s penultimate stage, the individual time trial, Contador added thirty-one
more seconds to his lead to win the 2010 Tour by thirty-nine seconds—the exact margin
that Contador obtained as a result of Schleck’s mechanical problems in Stage 16. Id.
6. See generally Jim Corbett, Legendary NFL QB Shows No Quit in His Love for
Game, USA TODAY, Aug. 21, 2009, at A.1. Favre was the quarterback of the NFL’s
Green Bay Packers from 1992 through 2007, during which he won three MVP awards
and led the team to a 1997 Super Bowl Championship. Id. Favre often contemplated retirement and announced his decision to leave the game following the 2007 season, opening the door for young Packers’ quarterback Aaron Rodgers. Id.; Hank Gola, Packers
Ready to Move On Without Legendary Leader, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 8, 2008, at 80. A
few weeks later Favre changed his mind, having felt forced out by the Packers. Corbett,
supra. Favre reportedly wanted to play for the Packers’ division rival, the Minnesota
Vikings. Gola, supra. Instead, the Packers traded Favre and the three years remaining on
his contract to the New York Jets on the condition that if the Jets traded Favre to the Vikings the Jets would owe the Packers three first round draft picks. Id. After a disappointing 2008 season, Favre again announced his retirement, causing the Jets to release him.
Corbett, supra. Ultimately still bitter about his departure from the Packers, Favre signed
with the Vikings for the 2009 season. Id.
7. Pete Caldera, Johnny Be Good; Damon Final Piece of Explosive Yankee Lineup,
REC. (N.J.), Dec. 24, 2005, at S.01. Damon was the centerfield on the Boston Red Sox
from 2002 through 2005, helping lead them to a World Series title in 2004—the franchise’s first since 1918. Tom Haudricourt, 2004 World Series at a Glance, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Oct. 23, 2004, at 04; Dan Shaughnessy, Yes!!! Red Sox Complete Sweep, Win
First Series in 86 Years, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 28, 2004, at A1. Following the 2005 season,
Damon signed a four-year, $52 million deal with the Red Sox’s arch rival the New York
Yankees, with whom he won a World Series in 2009. Caldera, supra; Jayson Stark, Damon
Steals
the
Show
in
Game
4,
ESPN
(Nov.
1,
2009),
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/playoffs/2009/columns/story?columnist=stark_jayson&id=
4615712.
8. Team Saxo Bank-SunGard was known as just Team Saxo Bank prior to the 2011
season. Hood, Riis Signs Contador, supra note 1.
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Bank-Sungard9 and Schleck successfully wooed four former Saxo Bank
riders to his new Leopard Trek team.10 This would be similar to the Yankees suddenly acquiring four of their starters from their arch rival Boston
Red Sox.
This type of mass free agency in cycling is of questionable value. The
advent of free agency in American professional sports has made roster
changes an accepted part of the game, causing some commentators (notably comedian Jerry Seinfeld) to note that we merely “root for laundry.”11 Nevertheless, the degree and nature of the turnover in professional cycling can quickly strip away any of laundry’s meaning. Undoubtedly, many 2010 Saxo Bank supporters found themselves rooting for Leopard Trek in 2011.
Rider movement is certainly not cycling’s biggest problem. More than
anything else, doping scandals have sundered the sport by chasing away
sponsors, destabilizing team operations, and causing annual chaos among
riders.12 At the time of writing of this Article, the status of Contador’s
2010 Tour de France title and cycling career hangs in the balance due to
doping allegations.13
9. Riis Signs Noval, Hernandez and Navarro for Saxo Bank-Sungard, VELO NEWS
(Aug. 12, 2010, 5:24 PM), http://velonews.competitor.com/2010/08/news/riis-signsnoval-hernandez-and-navarro-for-saxo-bank-sungard_134385. The three riders that left
Astana for Saxo Ban-SunGard were Benjamin Noval, Jesus Hernandez, and Daniel Navarro. Id.
10. Andrew Hood, Riis Not Losing Sleep Over ‘Leopard-Shack’ Merger, VELO NEWS
(Sept. 7, 2011, 9:23 AM), http://velonews.competitor.com/2011/09/news/riis-not-losingsleep-over-leopard-shack-merger_191207. The riders who left Saxo Bank for Leopard
Trek were: Frank Schleck, Stuart O’Grady, Fabian “Spartacus” Cancellara, and Jens
Voigt. Id.
11. Steve Buckley, Light’s Fight Not Too Bright, BOS. HERALD, Nov. 26, 2008, at 60;
Kevin Modesti, Stadiums Not Just Buildings, DAILY NEWS (L.A.), July 16, 2008, at C.1;
Scott Ostler, This Latest Squabble Won’t Stand Test of Time, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 13, 2007,
at D.1. The phrase means that fans root for the team jerseys rather than the individuals
wearing them.
12. John Ward Anderson, Doping Scandal Rocks Cycling, WASH. POST, July 1, 2006,
at E.1.
13. Alberto Contador Tests Positive for Clenbuterol, CYCLINGNEWS (Sept. 30, 2010,
10:06
AM),
http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/alberto-contador-tests-positive-forclenbuterol [hereinafter Contador Tests Positive]; Juliet Macur, Second Failed Test Puts
Heat on Contador, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2010, at B.11. In September 2010, it was revealed
that Contador had tested positive for the banned substance clenbuterol during the 2010
Tour de France. Contador Tests Positive, supra. It was later revealed that another urine
test of Contador’s taken during the Tour de France contained plastic residue indicative of
blood doping. Macur, supra. The Spanish Cycling Federation accepted Contador’s excuse that the failed tests were the result of eating tainted beef and declined to suspend
Contador. Contador Tests Positive, supra; UCI Appeals Contador Decision to Court of
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While the freedom of contract and employment opportunity is something to be celebrated considering the history of control exercised by
teams over their athletes across many sports, there are superior business
models that would improve the operations and financial viability of professional cycling while also making it more comprehensible and appealing to the fans. This Article will explain the current structure of international professional cycling and compare it to the typical structure of
American professional team sports. Lastly, this Article will explain key
areas where the structure and operations of professional cycling could be
improved by adopting a more American approach.
I. CURRENT STRUCTURE OF PROFESSIONAL CYCLING
A. International Cycling Union
Based in Aigle, Switzerland, the International Cycling Union, or Union
Cycliste Internationale (“UCI”) in French, is a nongovernmental, nonprofit, international association in accordance with Swiss law.14 The UCI
was created in 1900 and governs the world of cycling, including Olympic
participation.15 The members of the UCI are the national cycling federations of each country.16 As of 2011, more than 170 nations have a cycling
federation as a participating member in the UCI.17 Each national federation sends representatives to the UCI, which constitute the Congress of
the UCI.18 The Congress then elects a President of the UCI and nine other persons to form the Management Committee.19 The President and the

Arbitration
for
Sport,
CYCLINGNEWS
(Mar.
24,
2011,
1:56
PM),
http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/uci-appeals-contador-decision-to-court-of-arbitrationfor-sport [hereinafter UCI Appeals]. The UCI appealed to the Court of Arbitration for
Sport and a hearing is set for November 2011. Contador CAS Hearing Postponed until
CYCLINGNEWS
(July
26,
2011,
3:54
PM),
November,
http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/contador-cas-hearing-postponed-until-november;
UCI Appeals, supra.
14. Union Cycliste Internationale [UCI] [International Cycling Union], UCI Constitution, ch. II, art. 4, at 2 (Oct. 1, 2010) [hereinafter UCI Constitution], available at
http://www.uci.ch (follow “Rules” hyperlink; then follow “Constitution” hyperlink).
15. UCI, UCI Cycling Regulations: Part XI: Olympic Games, ch. I, para. 11.1.001, at
1 (Sept. 30, 2010) [hereinafter UCI Regulations, Part XI], available at http://www.uci.ch
(follow “Rules” hyperlink; then follow “Part XI: Olympic Games” hyperlink).
16. UCI Constitution, supra note 14, ch. II, art. 4, at 2.
17. See
National
Federations,
UCI,
http://www.uci.ch/templates/UCI/UCI1/layout.asp?MenuId=MTI2NjU&LangId=1 (last
visited Oct. 7, 2011).
18. UCI Constitution, supra note 14, ch. IV, art. 27, at 9.
19. Id. art. 29(e), at 9.
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Management Committee are elected every four years.20 Since 2006, former professional cyclist Pat McQuaid has served as President of the
UCI.21
In addition to the national federations, there are five continental confederations—Africa, America, Asia, Europe, and Oceania—grouping the
nations of each continental region into a single entity.22 Each of these
continental confederations appoints delegates to vote on possible
amendments to the UCI Cycling Regulations presented to the Congress.23
The number of votes for each continental confederation varies, presumably based on the continent’s perceived role in professional cycling: Africa has seven voting delegates; America, nine; Asia, nine; Europe, fourteen; and Oceania, only three, for a total of forty-two.24 The Congress
meets annually25 to debate and consider the issues, which are then presented to it by the Management Committee, and to be voted on by the
voting delegates.26 In the case of a tied vote, the proposal is rejected.27
The UCI Cycling Regulations are extensive in nature and govern nearly all the rules of cycling in eight different disciplines,28 including the
licensing of riders, teams, team managers,29 equipment,30 race length and
conditions, rider contracts and salaries,31 and drug testing.32 The UCI’s
structure, rules and purpose are substantially the same as other international sporting organizations such as Fédération Internationale de Foot-

20. Id. art. 48, para. 3, at 14.
21. Patrick
McQuaid,
UCI,
http://www.uci.ch/templates/UCI/UCI1/layout.asp?MenuId=MTI2NzU&LangId=1 (last
visited Oct. 7, 2011).
22. UCI Constitution, supra note 14, ch. III, art. 23, at 7.
23. Id. ch. IV, art. 36, para. 1, at 11.
24. Id. ch. IV, art. 36, para. 2, at 11.
25. Id. ch. IV, art. 28, para. 1, at 9.
26. Id. ch. IV, art. 31, at 10.
27. Id. ch. IV, art. 38, para. 1, at 11.
28. The eight different disciplines are road, track, mountain bike, cyclo-cross, BMX,
trials, indoor cycling and para-cycling. See, e.g., UCI, UCI Cycling Regulations: Part II:
Road Races (July 1, 2011) [hereinafter UCI Regulations, Part II], available at
www.uci.ch (follow “Rules” hyperlink; then follow “Part II: Road Races” hyperlink).
29. UCI, UCI Cycling Regulations: Part I: General Organisation of Cycling as a
Sport, ch. I, § 1, art. 1.1.010, at 2–3 (July 1, 2011) [hereinafter UCI Regulations, Part I],
available at www.uci.ch (follow “Rules” hyperlink; then follow “Part I: General organisation of cycling as a sport” hyperlink).
30. Id. ch. III, § 1, art. 1.3.001, at 57.
31. See UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28.
32. See UCI, UCI Cycling Regulations: Part XIV: Anti-Doping, (July 1, 2011) [hereinafter UCI Regulations, Part XIV], available at www.uci.ch (follow “Rules” hyperlink;
then follow “Part XIV: Antidoping Rules” hyperlink).
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ball Association (“FIFA”) and Fédération Internationale de Basketball
(“FIBA”).33
The UCI also hosts cycling events in addition to its regulatory role,
though not the most prestigious ones, as will be discussed in more detail
below.34 The UCI Constitution specifically designates the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”),35 also based in Switzerland, as “the sole competent authority to deal with and judge appeals” of decisions made by the
UCI, applying Swiss law if necessary.36
B. Teams
Licenses are required for nearly all persons who are involved in professional cycling, including riders, motorcycle pacers, team managers,
coaches, doctors, mechanics, announcers, and race organizers.37 The license confirms that “its holder undertakes to respect the [UCI] constitution and regulations” thereby authorizing him or her to participate in cycling events.38 While individual team members and staff must be licensed, teams themselves must register with the UCI.39 There are two
types of registered teams relevant to professional road cycling: ProTour
teams and Professional Continental teams.

33. For more information on FIBA, including its regulations, see About FIBA, FIBA,
http://www.fiba.com/pages/eng/fc/FIBA/quicFact/p/openNodeIDs/889/selNodeID/889/qu
icFacts.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2011); Official FIBA Regulations, FIBA,
http://www.fiba.com/pages/eng/fc/FIBA/ruleRegu/p/openNodeIDs/916/selNodeID/916/fi
baRegu.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2011). For more information on FIFA, including its
regulations,
see
Laws
and
Regulations,
FIFA,
http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/officialdocuments/doclists/laws.html (last visited Sept. 16,
2011);
Mission
&
Statutes,
FIFA,
http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/mission.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
34. See discussion infra Part II.D.
35. UCI Constitution, supra note 14, ch. XIII, at 21. The Court of Arbitration for
Sport (“CAS”) is an international arbitration body set up to settle disputes related to
sports. Its headquarters are in Lausanne; there are additional courts located in New York
City and Sydney, with ad-hoc courts created in Olympics host cities as required. For
more information on the CAS, see 20 Questions about the CAS, CT. ARB. FOR SPORT,
http://www.tas-cas.org/en/20questions.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2011); see generally Jason
Gubi, The Olympic Binding Arbitration Clause and the Court of Arbitration for Sport: An
Analysis of Due Process Concerns, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 997
(2008); Richard H. McLaren, Twenty-Five Years of the Court of Arbitration for Sport: A
Look in the Rear-View Mirror, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 305 (2010).
36. UCI Constitution, supra note 14, ch. XIII, at 21.
37. UCI Regulations, Part I, supra note 29, ch. 1, § 1, art. 1.1.001, at 1.
38. Id.
39. Id. ch. 1, § 3, art. 1.1.041, at 11.
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i. ProTour Teams
Each year the UCI issues a maximum of eighteen ProTour team licenses.40 The ProTour license grants the licensed team the right to participate
in the UCI WorldTour,41 to be discussed in more detail later.42 There are
four criteria upon which the UCI awards licenses: sporting, ethical, financial, and administrative.43 While the sporting criteria considers the
team’s previous performance,44 the ethical, financial, and administrative
criteria are important in a sport plagued by doping scandals,45 lacking
major revenue streams, and where team financial viability has been an
issue in the past.46 In considering whether a team has satisfied these crite40. UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28, ch. XV, §3, art. 2.15.009, at 82.
41. Id. ch. XV, § 2, art. 2.15.003, at 82.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 40–52.
43. UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28, ch. XV, § 3, art. 2.15.011, at 83.
44. A team ranked in the top fifteen will be deemed to have satisfied the sporting
criteria. A team ranked lower than twentieth shall not be considered to have satisfied the
sporting criterion, while teams ranked sixteen to twenty are examined more closely. Id.
ch. XV, § 3, art. 2.15.011a–b, at 83.
45. The use of illegal drugs in cycling is so prevalent in the sport’s history that there
is a Wikipedia page entitled “List of doping cases in cycling” dating all the way back to
1886.
See
List
of
Doping
Cases
in
Cycling,
WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_doping_cases_in_cycling (last updated Sept. 17,
2011). Among the more recent scandals, in 1998 the entire Festina team was thrown out
of the Tour de France and many other teams quit the race, John Ward Anderson, Downhill Ride; Has Cycling Bottomed Out? Will the Sport Rebound or Continue to SelfDestruct?, HAMILTON SPECTATOR (Can.), May 30, 2008, at 8; Simon Hart, The Road to
Ruin: Timeline of the Relentless Scandals that Keep Haunting the Sport, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), May 21, 2010, at 10; in 2006 former Tour de France winner Jan
Ullrich was forced out of the Tour de France the night before as part of a doping investigation, Anderson, supra; Hart, supra; 2006 Tour de France winner Floyd Landis tested
positive for blood doping and had his title revoked, Anderson, supra; Hart, supra; in
2007, the leader of the Tour de France, Michael Rasmussen was kicked out mid-tour for
lying about his pre-race whereabouts and missing drug tests, Leader Rasmussen Kicked
EXAM’R
(July
26,
2007),
Off
Tour,
IRISH
http://search.proquest.com/docview/758388530/fulltext?accountid=37371; and in 2008
defending champion of the Tour de France, Alberto Contador, was unable to defend his
title because his Astana team was involved in a doping scandal, Astana Banned From
Tour de France; Contador Likely Won’t Defend Title, ESPN (Feb. 13, 2008, 4:14 PM),
http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/cycling/news/story?id=3243640.
46. In mid-season 2003, team sponsor Coast was replaced by Bianchi after Coast was
unable to pay riders and staff for several months. Alasdair Fotheringham, Ullrich Reaches Crossroads in Tour of Troubles; Former Champion Aims to Puts [sic] His Career
Back on Track from the Ruins of Alcohol, Drugs and Team Bankruptcy, INDEP. (U.K.),
June 9, 2003, at 6 [hereinafter Fotheringham, Ullrich Reaches Crossroads], available at
2003 WLNR 10452766. In 2001, the British Linda McCartney Cycling Team, was unable
to pay its riders for several months, leading the UCI to file a criminal complaint against
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ria, the UCI will examine the team’s anti-doping compliance,47 satisfaction of contractual and legal obligations,48 financial records,49 and compliance with UCI regulations.50 As a condition of registering as a ProTour team, the team agrees to participate in the biological passport program51 and be subject to the UCI’s anti-doping rules.52
While teams are often associated with their title sponsor, such as Team
RadioShack or Saxo Bank, the team’s actual legal name will likely be
something different than that of its sponsor, which may not be associated
with the team in a year or two.53 Each team is a legal entity, such as a
corporation or limited liability company, created under the laws of one of
various countries. While in American sports the owner of a professional
sports team is often publicly known,54 this is not the case in professional
the team alleging that a fraudulent bank guarantee was presented to the UCI. See Kieran
Daley, Union Presses Case Against Defunct Team, INDEP. (U.K.), Mar. 7, 2001, at 29,
available at 2001 WLNR 7209761.
47. UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28, ch. XV, § 3, art. 2.15.011c, at 83.
48. Id.
49. Id. ch. XV, § 3, art. 2.15.011d, at 83.
50. Id. ch. XV, § 3, art. 2.15.011e, at 83.
51. Id. ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.070a, at 95. The biological passport program is administered by the UCI and the World Anti-Doping Association (“WADA”).
A biological passport is an individual, electronic record for each rider, in which
the results of all doping tests over a period of time are collated. The passport
for each rider will contain: (1) results of individual urine tests; (2) results of individual blood tests; (3) a haematological profile consisting of the combined results of haematological parameters analysed in a series of blood samples; and
(4) a steroid profile consisting of the combined results of steroid levels in a series of urine samples.
Id. For more information, see Biological Passport – Questions / Answers, UCI (Feb. 9,
2011),
http://www.uci.ch/templates/UCI/UCI2/layout.asp?MenuId=MTU4ODY&LangId=1.
52. UCI Regulations, Part XIV, supra note 32, ch. I, r. 1, at 1. The UCI anti-doping
rules are based on the World Anti-Doping Code as approved by the WADA. See id.
“WADA was established in 1999 as an international independent agency composed and
funded equally by the sport movement and governments of the world. Its key activities
include scientific research, education, development of anti-doping capacities, and monitoring of the World Anti Doping Code.” About WADA, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY
[WADA] (June 2011), http://www.wada-ama.org/en/About-WADA. The WADA Code is
used for the Olympics and most other international athletic competitions. Id.
53. See Thomas A. Valentinsen, Riis Cycling Announces 2011 Team SunGard-Saxo
(Aug.
3,
2010,
1:40
AM),
Bank,
ROADCYCLING.COM
http://www.roadcycling.com/articles/Riis-Cycling-Announces-2011-Team-SunGard—Saxo-Bank—-Saxo-Bank-to-Continue-Cooperation-with-Riis-Cycling_003785.shtml.
54. Some owners become symbolic or iconic and are more associated with the team
than any player or coach. Such figures include the late George Steinbrenner of the New
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cycling. Bjarne Riis, a former Tour de France winner,55 is a notable exception as the owner and team manager of Riis Cycling. Riis Cycling
(originally named Professional Cycling Denmark) was formed in 1998
following Riis’ retirement as a professional rider.56 However, on any
media platform, Riis Cycling’s team is not referred to as “Riis Cycling”
but instead by its corporate sponsor as will be discussed below.57
An athlete’s involvement with the team can create confusion: following doping allegations by former teammate Floyd Landis in May 2010,
the federal government opened an investigation into Lance Armstrong
and the teams that helped him win seven consecutive Tours de France
from 1999 to 2005.58 From 1996 through 2004 the team, Capital Sports
and Entertainment, LLC, was sponsored by the United States Postal Service, and in 2005 the team was sponsored by the Discovery Channel.59
As the investigation began, Armstrong repeatedly countered the description of those teams being “his teams” by stating he was simply a rider
(employee) with no ownership interest in the team.60 However, prior to
the 2005 season, Armstrong was given an 11.5% equity interest in the
team, though he was still not involved in the operations of the team.61
The team exited pro cycling in 2007 but returned for the 2010 cycling
season as Armstrong was completing his comeback. It is believed that by
then Armstrong had obtained a much larger interest in the team, as he
was essential to the team’s major sponsorship agreements, including Ra-

York Yankees or Al Davis of the NFL’s Oakland Raiders. See Cam Inman, Op-Ed., Davis Could Learn a Thing or Two from the Boss, OAKLAND TRIBUNE, Oct. 30, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 21746037.
55. Riis won the 1996 Tour de France but it was later revealed that he used performance enhancing drugs during his career and in that race. See Riis: We’ve Come Clean,
ADVERTISER (Austl.), Aug. 5, 2010, at 76.
56. See Tour Team History Part 2, ROAD BIKE ACTION MAG. (July 20, 2009),
http://www.roadbikeaction.com/RBA-Features/content/197/1955/Tour-Team-HistoryPart-2.html; Matt Rendell & Susanne Horsdal, Life after Lance, OBSERVER (London),
July 2, 2006, at 34.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 65–67.
58. Juliet Macur, Armstrong Distances Himself from Doping Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES,
July 15, 2010, at B11; Race Winners Since 1903, LE TOUR DE FRANCE,
http://www.letour.fr/2011/TDF/HISTO/us/palmares.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2011)
[hereinafter Macur, Armstrong Distances Himself].
59. Dean Bonham, Armstrong Adds Kick to Postal Service Efforts, ROCKY MTN
NEWS, May 12, 2001, at 4.C; The History of Race Cycling, DISCOVERY CHANNEL,
http://www.yourdiscovery.com/team/history/index.shtml (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
60. Macur, Armstrong Distances Himself, supra note 58.
61. Id.; Bonnie D. Ford, Lance’s Comments Differ from Testimony, ESPN (July 14,
2010, 7:08 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/cycling/news/story?id=5380225.
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dioShack, Nike, Trek, and Nissan. Nevertheless, a rider having an equity
ownership in the team is extraordinarily rare.
Once the team is formed as a legal entity, it must obtain sponsorship to
maintain financial viability. The sport of cycling, despite drawing millions of spectators each year,62 cannot charge admission based on its inherent nature as a distance event. Consequently, nearly all of a team’s
revenue comes from sponsors who find it beneficial to associate themselves with that team.63 These sponsors cover a variety of industries,
though many obviously relate to cycling. The team’s most important
sponsors are the “principal partners” whose names and color schemes
will be used as the team name and make up the bulk of the team’s uniform.64
For example, Riis Cycling was originally named “Team home—Jack
& Jones” for the Danish-based clothing company.65 The team has since
undergone several name changes as its principal sponsors have
changed.66 The team began to achieve more success when it brought on
the American company Computer Sciences Corporation (“CSC”) as a
principal sponsor in 2001.67
Unfortunately the history of doping in the sport has significantly hindered sponsorship arrangements, as many sponsors have become weary
of associating themselves with a team or athlete that could result in sporting disgrace.68 Most principal sponsorship arrangements with teams are
62. The Tour de France draws an estimated ten to fifteen million people to its route
each year. Colin Bateman, British Are Coming with Genuine Tour de Force in Tour de
France, EXPRESS (London), July 3, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 13370710; Jeremy
Whittle, Mark Cavendish Rips Up Tour Record Books as He Claims Tenth Stage Win,
(July
27,
2009),
TIMES
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/sport/more_sport/cycling/article6728238.ece (Eng.).
63. Michel Desbordes, The Economics of Cycling, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS
OF SPORT 398, 409 (Wladimir Androff & Stefan Szymanski eds., 2006).
64. UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28, ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.050, at 90.
65. Tour Team History Part 2, supra note 56; The World’s Best Cycling Team Celebrates 10-Year Anniversary, RIIS CYCLING (Aug. 27, 2011, 7:55 PM), http://www.riiscycling.com/ny_news.asp?n_id=1495&lang=uk.
66. See Brecht Decaluwé, Riis Announces Two New Sponsors for Future,
CYCLINGNEWS (July 12, 2010, 10:37 PM), http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/riisannounces-two-new-sponsors-for-future.
67. The team’s success culminated in 2008 when team member Carlos Sastre won the
Tour de France and the team won the team classification. See Sastre, CSC-Saxo Bank
Deliver Tour de France Win for New Bell Volt, EASTERN-BELL SPORTS,
http://www.eastonbellsports.com/sastre-csc-saxo-bank-deliver-tour-de-france-win-fornew-bell-volt (last visited Sept. 27, 2011).
68. See Jim Vertuno, Discovery Team Disbands: Elite American Cycling Unit Unable
to Secure New Sponsor, FT. WAYNE J. GAZETTE, Aug. 11, 2007, at 6B, available at 2007
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for only one or two years as a result.69 Continuing the Riis Cycling example, after a six-year period in which CSC was the sole principal sponsor of Riis Cycling, the Danish bank Saxo Bank joined as another principal sponsor in 2008 and was the sole principal sponsor in 2009 and
2010.70 UCI Regulations permit teams to have a maximum of two principal sponsors.71 Saxo Bank was prepared to leave the cycling sponsorship
market following the expiration of its 2010 contract, but was convinced
to come back in as a co-principal partner along with the American software company SunGard when Riis was able to secure Contador as a rider.72
As a result of unstable sponsorship issues and the resulting financial
difficulties, the UCI imposes a number of regulations meant to help provide stability to the sport. First, the team must have a “paying agent”
who is the person or entity responsible for the team’s financial, contractual and legal obligations, such as rider and sponsorship contracts.73 The
paying agent can only act through the physical persons who hold a UCI
license.74 For Team Saxo Bank-SunGard, most likely Riis Cycling is the
paying agent, acting through Bjarne Riis, who holds a UCI license. Second, a team’s ProTour license is generally granted for a four-year period.75 However, each team must register each year anew pursuant to the
criteria described earlier.76 Third, the paying agent is required to provide
key financial documents to the UCI, including account statements, profit
and loss statements, cash flow plans, and budgets.77 Fourth, each team
WLNR 15678617 (discussing the disbanding of the Discovery team, on which Lance
Armstrong won seven Tours de France, including several years when the team was sponsored by the US Postal Service); see also Ian Austen, Cycling’s Drug Problem Leads TMobile to End Sponsorship, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2007, at D1, available at 2007 WLNR
23464048 (discussing T-Mobile ending a sixteen-year run as a major sponsor of professional cycling due to doping scandals).
69. Interview with John Wilcockson, Editor, VeloNews.com (Aug. 16, 2010) (Wilcockson has covered over forty Tours de France for a variety of publications and has
written seven books on the sport of cycling); see, e.g., Doreen Carvajal, After Scandal,
Cycling Struggles for Sponsors, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2007, at C.5.
70. History,
RIIS
CYCLING,
http://www.riiscycling.com/pages.asp?pa_id=5&top_menu=2&under_menu=1 (last visited Sept. 27,
2011).
71. UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28, ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.055, at 91.
72. Moore, Tour Champion Contador to Replace Schleck at Saxo Bank, GUARDIAN,
supra note 4.
73. UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28, ch. XV, § 4, arts. 2.15.057–63, at 91–92.
74. Id. ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.060, at 92.
75. Id. ch. XV, § 3, art. 2.15.031, at 86–87.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 40–52.
77. UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28, ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.068, at 94.
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must obtain a bank guarantee for the team’s debts, including its contracts.78
The UCI Regulations are demonstrative that “[t]he financial stability of
the UCI ProTeam must be ensured at all times, in particular by adequate
owner’s equity.”79 For example, the Regulations state that all “income
deriv[ed] from the . . . [team] must be allocated exclusively [for the] operations of the team.80
A typical budget for a ProTeam is between $10 and $20 million.81
However, in 2010, in its first season of racing, Britain’s Team Sky was
believed to have a budget in excess of $50 million.82 It was revealed in
2011 that the United States Postal Service paid approximately $8 million
per year to finance Lance Armstrong’s teams between 2001 and 2004.83
The $8 million represented approximately 60–65% of the team’s budget.84
The financial requirements are essential to ensuring that each ProTeam
is professionally staffed and maintained. Each UCI ProTeam must have
“at least [twenty-three] riders, [two] team managers and [eight] other
staff . . . on a full-time basis.”85 The maximum number of riders depends
on the number of “new professionals” a team has, up to a maximum of
thirty total riders.86 A new professional is simply a rider in his first year
as a professional.
ii. Professional Continental Teams
A Professional Continental team is substantially the same as a ProTour
team in its organization, licensing, registration, organization, UCI obligations, funding, and more. One key difference is that in its licensing and
registration process, a Continental team is not judged on a sporting criteria.87 “Each . . . continental team must employ at least [sixteen] riders,
78. Id. ch. XV, § 4, arts. 2.15.092–96, at 99.
79. Id. ch. XV, § 4, art. 15.090, at 99.
80. Id.
81. Tom Zed, Wheel of Fortune and Global Power Corporate High-Flyers Descend
on Tour, ADVERTISER (Austl.), Jan. 22, 2010, at 12.
82. Steve Mcmorran, Greipel Wins Tour Down Under; Sutton Takes Sixth Stage for
NEWS
(Jan.
24,
2010,
1:05
PM),
Team
Sky,
680
http://www.680news.com/sports/article/20150—greipel-wins-tour-down-under-suttontakes-sixth-stage-for-team-sky.
83. Shaun Assael, Details of Lance Armstrong Sponsorship, ESPN (Jan. 14, 2011,
5:03 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/cycling/news/story?id=6019436.
84. Id.
85. UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28, ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.049, at 89–90.
86. Id. ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.110, at 103.
87. Id. ch. XVI, art. 2.16.013, at 135.
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[two] team managers, and [three] other staff . . . on a full-time basis.”88 A
Continental team can have a maximum of twenty-five riders.89
A Continental team may aspire to become a ProTour team, and the
Continental team status functions as an important stepping stone in the
process. Cycling’s Grand Tours (the Tour de France, Giro d’Italia, and
Vuelta a España) typically have between twenty and twenty-two teams
each year—more than the eighteen teams licensed as ProTour teams each
year by the UCI.90 Consequently, each year two to four Continental
teams have the opportunity to participate in cycling’s biggest events and
make headlines. The Continental team can then apply for the next season
for a ProTour license based on its performance in the prior season.91
This two-tiered system operates similarly to the promotion and relegation system used in European sports, most notably soccer. In promotion
and relegation, a sports league is divided into several divisions, with the
highest division composed of the best caliber of teams and players.92 At
the end of each season, each division in the league will relegate or demote the bottom two or three teams from that division to the next lowest
division. In their place, the top two or three teams from that next lowest
division will be promoted to the higher division. The demoted teams may
be given some financial support while the promoted teams may have to
meet off-the-field conditions to ensure promotion, such as financial solvency, stadium capacity, and facilities.93
The promotion and relegation system permits teams to start at the very
bottom of the sporting world and rise to the very top. Although professional cycling only has two “divisions” as compared to English soccer’s

88. Id. ch. XVI, art. 2.16.001, at 132.
89. Id. ch. XVI, art. 2.16.032, at 142.
90. Id. ch. XV, § 3, art. 2.15.009, at 82. In the 2010 Tour de France, the four Continental teams that participated were (1) Bbox Bouygues Telecom; (2) Cofidis, Le Credit
En Ligne; (3) Cervelo Test Team; and (4) BMC Racing Team. See 2010 UCI Professional Continental Teams, UCI, (Aug. 12, 2010), http://www.uci.ch/templates/BUILTINNOFRAMES/Template1/layout.asp?MenuId=MTU4MTU&LangId=1; 2010, UCI (Aug.
12, 2010), available at http://www.uci.ch (follow the “Road” hyperlink; then follow the
“Results” hyperlink; follow the “Men Elite” hyperlink; select “2010” from the season
drop down menu; select “Tour De France” from the event list; follow the “General Classification” hyperlink; select the “Team Time” tab) (last visited Sept. 20, 2011).
91. See UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28, ch. XV, art. 2.15.009, at 82 & ch.
XVI, 2.16.013, at 135.
92. Id. ch. XVI, arts. 2.16.010 bis–16, at 134–37.
93. For more on the benefits of the promotion and relegation system, see Stephen F.
Ross & Stefan Szymanski, Open Competition in League Sports, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 625
(2002).
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five,94 the system still reduces the barriers to and costs of entry for professional cycling teams.
iii. Association Internationale des Groupes Cyclistes Professionnels
All teams, whether ProTour and Continental, registered with the UCI
collectively form the International Association of Professional Cycling
groups, or Association Internationale des Groupes Cyclistes Professionnels (“AIGCP”) in French. The AIGCP has very little power in the structure of professional cycling. While the AIGCP and the riders’ union, Cyclistes Professionnels Associes (“CPA”), do negotiate Joint Agreements
governing certain aspects of the riders employment, the agreements are
very basic and do not substantially impact the sport, as will be discussed
in further detail later. In addition, the AIGCP and its member teams do
not host any events from which to draw revenue.
Teams registered as ProTour teams formed the International Professional Cycling Teams (“IPCT”) following the formation of the ProTour
in 2005, as will be discussed in more detail below. The IPCT supplements the larger AIGCP but, like the AIGCP, only serves an advisory
role in the business of professional cycling.95
C. Cyclists
A cyclist who wishes to become a professional must obtain a UCI license from the national federation where he or she resides.96 Each national federation can determine the criteria for issuing a license.97 The
only criteria set by USA Cycling, the American national federation, is
the completion of an application, that the cyclist be at least nineteen
years old, and payment of $60.98
A rider is free to sign a contract with any team registered with the UCI
once he obtains his UCI license. A rider will have reached such a level

94. For a current listing of the teams in each of the five levels, see SOCCER ASS’N,
www.soccerassociation.com (follow “England” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 7, 2011).
95. Interview with John Wilcockson, supra note 69; see generally Andrew Hood,
Tuesday’s EuroFile: Disco Leaves AIGCP, VELO NEWS (Jan. 19, 2007, 1:00 AM),
http://velonews.competitor.com/2007/06/road/tuesdays-eurofile-disco-leaves-aigcpbasso-vows-return-honchar-booted_12435 (stating that while the AIGCP and the IPCT
are both independent cycling professionals’ associations, the highest level of cycling
competitions do not require cyclists to maintain memberships with either organization).
96. UCI Regulations, Part I, supra note 29, ch. 1, art. 1.1.011, at 3.
97. Id. ch. 1, § 1, art. 1.1.006, at 2.
98. USA CYCLING, Rider Application/Renewal License Form (Nov. 2010), available
at http://www.usacycling.org/forms/waiver.php?url=license_app.pdf (click “I Agree”
button).
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by entering and doing well in races sanctioned by his national federation
as an individual beforehand. A contract of employment with either a UCI
ProTeam or a Continental team is governed by the standard cycling contract under UCI Regulations and the Joint Agreements as negotiated by
AIGCP and the CPA.99
i. Cyclistes Professionnels Associes and the Joint Agreements
The CPA is effectively the labor union for professional road cyclists
but either lacks or has substantially failed to act upon any of its potential
power under European law.100 The CPA, like the AIGCP, has little influence on the direction and structure of professional cycling. With few employees and resources, the CPA is relegated to an advisory role.101
A cyclist contract must be for a fixed period of years, beginning and
ending on December 31.102 For the 2010 season, the minimum salary for
a ProTour rider was €33,000 (about $42,500 as of March 2011).103 The
minimum for a Continental rider was €27,500 (approximately
$35,500).104 These amounts do not include any bonuses, compensation,
prizes, or other benefits awarded from races.105 In the past, teams have
had difficulty making payroll,106 and as a result, if a team fails to pay a
rider on time, the rider’s payment is automatically increased at an annual
interest rate of 5%.107
The Joint Agreements ensure that teams provide disability and insurance benefits to the riders in addition the rider’s salary. A rider injured
99. UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28, ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.111, at 104. The
standard contract can be found in Part II, Chapter XV, Section 4, Article 2.15.139 of the
UCI Cycling Regulations. In practice, most riders first sign with continental teams before
making a ProTeam.
100. See, e.g., Desbordes, supra note 63, at 403, 409 (explaining that cycling teams are
financed solely by sponsors who often become insolvent and leave the team’s riders unemployed).
101. Interview with John Wilcockson, supra note 69; see, e.g., Greg Johnson & Paul
Verkuylen, CPA, UCI to Increase Communication, CYCLINGNEWS (Mar. 26, 2008),
http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/cpa-uci-to-increase-communication.
102. UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28, ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.139, at 111.
103. UCI, Joint Agreements, ch. II, art. 10, at 172–73 (Sept. 30, 2010), available at
http://www.uci.ch (follow “Rules” hyperlink; then follow “Joint Agreements” hyperlink)
[hereinafter UCI Regulations, Joint Agreements].
104. Id. A new professional on a ProTour team received a minimum of €26,700 (about
$34,500) and a new professional on a Continental team received a minimum of €23,000
(about $29,500). Id.
105. UCI Regulations, Joint Agreements, supra note 103, ch. II, art. 14, at 174.
106. See Daley, supra note 46; Fotheringham, Ullrich Reaches Crossroads, supra note
46.
107. UCI Regulations, Joint Agreements, supra note 103, ch. II, art. 21, at 175.
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during the course of his employment is entitled to his full salary for three
months and 50% of his salary for another three months, so long as the
amount being paid is not less than the minimum annual salaries discussed earlier.108 To be eligible for the benefits, “industrial disablement”
must be established.109 This European standard examines the level of disablement “by reference to a person of the same age and sex whose physical and mental condition is normal.”110 Obtaining industrial disablement
benefits “normally requires a disablement assessment of at least
[14%].”111 How this compares with disability insurance in American
sports will be discussed later in the Article.
In addition, where a rider is not already covered under a national health
insurance and/or pension program, the team is required to take out policies to cover the rider.112 Most European riders—as opposed to American
riders—are covered by some type of national health insurance.113 Consequently, this provision potentially makes American riders more expensive to a team than comparable European riders because the team has to
contribute to a health insurance plan for the American rider.
ii. Free Agency and the Bosman Ruling
Perhaps the most important part of the cyclist’s contract is the set of
terms governing his future employment. In American sports, we are familiar with the concept of free agency, e.g., when a player has accrued a
certain amount of experience114 as determined by a collective bargaining
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Nicholas J. Wikeley, Social Security Appeals in Great Britain, 46 ADMIN. L. REV.
183, 189 (1994).
111. Id.
112. UCI Regulations, Joint Agreements, supra note 103, ch. II, art. 22, at 176.
113. See Gregory L. Weiss, U.S. Health Care Situation Isn’t Unique, ROANOKE TIMES,
Dec. 6, 2009, at 3 (listing Argentina, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
China, Cuba, Denmark, England, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama,
Peru, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Scotland, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan as countries with some form of universal health
care).
114. See, e.g., Major League Baseball & Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, art.
XX(B)(1), at 70 (Dec. 20, 2006), http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf
[hereinafter MLB CBA] (stating that in Major League Baseball, a player must have at
least six years of Major League Service to be a free agent); Nat’l Basketball Ass’n &
Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n, 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement, NAT’L
BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS’N, art. XI, § 4(b), at 240 (July 2005)
http://www.nbpa.org/cba/2005 [hereinafter NBA CBA] (stating that in the National Basketball Association, a player must have at least four seasons to be an Unrestricted Free
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agreement (“CBA”) between his union and the teams, and his contract
has expired, he may offer his services to any and all bidders for a salary
limited only by the terms of the CBA.115
While free agency rights in American sports were mostly developed in
the 1970s,116 the rights of European athletes were not conclusively established until the Bosman ruling in 1995.117 Jean-Marc Bosman was a soccer player on the Belgian club RC Liege whose contract expired at the
end of June 1990.118 In April 1990, RC Liege offered Bosman a contract
worth a quarter of what he made the previous year, which he rejected.119
As a result of his rejection, Bosman was placed on the “compulsory”

Agent.); Nat’l Football League & Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 2006-2012 Collective Bargaining Agreement, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, art. XIX, § 1(a), at 57 (Mar. 8,
2006), http://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/image/cba/nfl-cba-2006-2012.pdf [hereinafter NFL CBA] (stating that in the National Football League, a player must have at
least four Accrued Seasons to be an unrestricted free agent); Nat’l Hockey League &
Nat’l Hockey League Players Ass’n, 2005-2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement, NAT’L
HOCKEY LEAGUE, art. 10, § 10.1(a), at 27 (July 22, 2005), http://www.nhl.com/cba/2005CBA.pdf [hereinafter NHL CBA] (stating that in the National Hockey League, a player’s
free agency rights depend on both the player’s age and experience. Generally a player
who is at least twenty-seven years old or has seven or more Accrued Seasons is an unrestricted free agent.).
115. The NFL and MLB CBAs have no maximum salaries, although in the NFL, as a
practical matter, salaries are limited by the salary cap provisions. See generally MLB
CBA, supra note 114, art. XX(B)(2), at 70–72; NFL CBA, supra note 114, art. XXIV, at
82–144. In the NBA, a player can earn 25%, 30%, or 35% of his team’s salary cap, depending on his level of experience. NBA CBA, supra note 114, art. II, § 7, at 33–34. In
the NHL, a player can earn a maximum of 20% of his team’s salary cap. NHL CBA,
supra note 114, art. 50, § 50.6, at 218–19.
116. See Chris Deubert & Glenn M. Wong, Understanding the Evolution of Signing
Bonuses and Guaranteed Money in the National Football League: Preparing for the
2011 Collective Bargaining Negotiations, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 179, 183–90 (2009)
(describing the leading cases that led to free agency in the respective sports: in the NFL,
Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), aff’d in relevant
part, 543 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1976); in the NHL, Phila. World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Phila.
Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972); in the NBA, Robertson v. Nat’l
Basketball Ass’n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 872–73 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); in the MLB, Kansas City
Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 409 F. Supp. 233 (W.D.
Mo. 1976), aff’d, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976)).
117. Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Ass’n v. Bosman,
1995 E.C.R. I-04921 [hereinafter Bosman]; see generally Andrew L. Lee, The Bosman
Case: Protecting Freedom of Movement in European Football, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
1255 (1996); Amikam Omer Kranz, The Bosman Case: The Relationship between European Union Law and the Transfer System in European Football, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 431
(1999).
118. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-04921, ¶ 28.
119. Id. ¶ 29.
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transfer list, which allowed RC Liege to shop Bosman’s rights to any
interested team in return for a compensation fee meant to cover the costs
of training the player.120 When RC Liege and US Dunkerque, a French
team, were unable to come to a suitable agreement, RC Liege chose to
suspend Bosman for the entire season.121
Bosman challenged the league’s transfer rules as an illegal obstacle to
the free movement of workers under European Community (“EC”)
law.122 After a protracted legal battle, the European Court of Justice, the
highest court in the EC in matters of EC law, ruled that “freedom of
movement for workers . . . is a fundamental freedom” in the EC and that
private associations cannot adopt sporting rules which restrict the exercise of rights conferred on individuals by EC law.123
The result of the Bosman decision was that athletes in EC states could
now offer their services to any team upon the expiration of their contract
without their prior team having any say in the matter or receiving any
type of compensation. Nevertheless, a lucrative transfer system remains
whereby teams can loan or outright transfer a player still under contract
to another team for large sums of money.124
UCI Regulations specifically state that at the expiration of a rider’s
contract, “the [r]ider shall be entirely free to leave the [team] and sign a
contract with a third party”125 and “[a]ll transfer payment systems are
prohibited.”126 However, UCI Regulations permit a transfer period from
August 1 to December 31, during which UCI ProTeams or license applicants may recruit riders for the following year.127 As a result, as in the
case of Contador discussed at the beginning of this Article, it is common
for riders to agree to ride for a new team the following calendar year de120. Id. ¶¶ 8, 30.
121. Id. ¶ 33.
122. Id. ¶ 92. The law most importantly invoked by Bosman was Article 48 of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community, first signed by Belgium, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany in 1957. Id. This Treaty has been
amended and added to many times and is part of the law of all nations of the European
Union. See generally Ingolf Pernice, The Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel Constitutionalism
in Action, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 349 (2009) (detailing the development of European Union
law).
123. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-04921, Summary ¶¶ 7, 8, 9, 12.
124. See GLENN M. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF SPORTS LAW § 10.4, at 502–04 (4th ed.
2010) (describing the Bosman case and stating that in 2009, the Spanish soccer club, Real
Madrid, set a record when it paid ninety-three million euros (about $131 million at the
time) to obtain forward Cristiano Ronaldo from Manchester United).
125. UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28, ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.139, at 113 (quoting Article 7 of the “Standard contract between a rider and a UCI Proteam”).
126. Id. ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.120, at 106.
127. See id. ch. XV, § 4, arts. 2.15.120–20b, at 106–07.
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spite four months remaining on their current contract. The Vuelta a España, one of cycling’s Grand Tours, is unfortunately held during this
“lame duck” period.
A team may not negotiate with a rider under contract except during the
transfer period.128 Teams and riders that violate this rule are subject to
fines of 5,000 (about $4,700) and 2,000 (about $1,900) Swiss francs, respectively.129
Finally, there is one particularly interesting provision concerning the
employment of cyclists—riders and teams have the option to agree to a
contract whereby the rider is a “self-employed worker.”130 The contract
between the rider and the team must honor most, but not all, of the provisions of the standard contract.131 The major differences being that the
rider’s salary must be at least 150% of the minimum salary (almost
$64,000 for a ProTour rider),132 and riders are required to pay for and
prove that they have their own health and disability insurance.133
D. Races and Race Organizers
A UCI ProTour license, as mentioned earlier, is meant to provide the
licensed team with the opportunity to enter UCI WorldTour events.134 In
fact, all UCI ProTour teams are required to participate in all events on
the UCI WorldTour.135 It is important to point out that most of the events
on the UCI WorldTour are not organized by the UCI; the events are organized by other entities that agree to host an event as part of the
128. Id. ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.121a, at 107.
129. Id. ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.125, at 108.
130. Id. ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.115 bis, at 104–05.
131. Id. ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.115 bis(3), at 105.
132. Id.; see also UCI Regulations, Joint Agreements, supra note 103, ch. II, art. 10, at
172–73.
133. UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28, ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.115 bis(4–6), at
105.
134. Id. ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.003, at 82. In 2010, there was a sixteen-event UCI ProTour as well as separate events, including the three Grand Tours (Giro d’Italia, Tour de
France, and Vuelta a España), which made up a World Calendar. See 2010 UCI ProTour
Races, UCI WORLDTOUR, http://www.uciprotour.com (follow “Races” hyperlink; then
follow “Archives” hyperlink; then follow “UCI 2010 ProTour” hyperlink) (last visited
Oct. 7, 2011); 2010-2011 UCI Road Calendar, UCI, http://www.uci.ch (follow “Road”
hyperlink; then follow “Calendar” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 7, 2011). The dual system
was eliminated prior to the 2011 season and all of the events were merged into one UCI
WorldTour. John Wilcockson, Confusion Continues as ProTour Teams Will Start All 26
Races in New UCI World Tour, VELO NEWS (Oct. 5, 2010, 3:30 PM),
http://velonews.competitor.com/2010/10/news/confusion-continues-as-protour-teamswill-start-all-26-races-in-new-uci-world-tour_144865.
135. Id. ch. XV, § 10, art. 2.15.261, at 131.
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WorldTour for a variety of reasons, most notably it requires the best
teams in the world to participate in the event. The UCI ProTour (the precursor to the current UCI WorldTour) and ProTour licensing schemes
were created in 2005, replacing the fractured UCI Road World Cup Series. The new system was meant to address many of the problems discussed in this Article, including the short-term team sponsorship agreements, the financial viability of teams, and problems with doping.
A key to the UCI ProTour’s initial success was convincing the three
organizers of the Grand Tours to include their events as part of the ProTour. To make clear, the UCI is not involved in the creation, planning,
financing, or operations of the three most important events in professional cycling. Instead, the Tour de France is organized by the Amaury Sport
Organisation (“ASO”), the Giro d’Italia is organized by RCS Sport, and
the Vuelta a España is organized by ASO and Unipublic. Both organizations organize other cycling as well as sporting events.136
The ASO and other race organizers realistically have the most power
in the world of professional cycling. The race organizers own the most
lucrative asset in professional cycling: the television rights to the Tour de
France and other major events. The Tour de France is broadcast on approximately 118 channels in over 185 countries and is worth approximately $125 million in annual revenue to the ASO.137
The Grand Tours are keenly aware of their power in the sport. After a
contentious 2007 ProTour season, the three Grand Tours withdrew from
the UCI ProTour.138 The Grand Tours did not want to be forced to accept
all eighteen ProTour teams into their events, instead wanting the freedom
to invite more Professional Continental teams, which bring a national
constituency and fan-base.139 The UCI urged all ProTour teams to boycott ASO’s March 2007 Paris-Nice race, claiming it was a forbidden race
136. The Amaury Sport Organisation, based in France, also organizes Paris-Nice, Paris-Roubaix, Liege-Bastogne-Liege, the Paris Marathon, and the French Open in golf. For
more information see AMAURY SPORT ORG., http://www.aso.fr/us/homepage.html (last
visited Sept. 16, 2011). RCS Sport, part of RCS Mediagroup based in Italy, also organizes Milan-San Remo and the Milan Marathon. For more information see RCS MEDIA
GROUP, http://www.rcsmediagroup.it/wps/portal/mg/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
BUS.,
137. Kasey
Coholan,
The
Tour
de
France:
Paris,
CAN.
http://www.canadianbusiness.com/article/16823—the-tour-de-france-paris (last visited
Sept. 17, 2011).
138. John Henderson, Cycling Feud Requires Vaughter to Ride to Rescue of Sport,
DENVER POST, Apr. 19, 2009, at C5.
139. Val Migliaccio, Peace Deal Ends Trauma for Tour, ADVERTISER (Austl.), Aug.
19, 2008, at 87; see also UCI Versus Grand Tour Organisers: The Gloves Are Off,
CYCLINGNEWS.COM
(Dec.
10,
2005),
http://autobus.cyclingnews.com/features/?id=2005/pro_tour_disarray.
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under UCI Regulations.140 In response, ASO threatened to ban any rider
who boycotted Paris-Nice from participating in the Tour de France.141
Although neither the boycott nor the ban was carried out, during the
2008 Tour de France, seventeen of the eighteen ProTour teams142 participating threatened not to apply for ProTour licenses the following year,
which would have crippled the ProTour arrangement.143
A crisis was averted in September 2008 when ASO and the UCI
reached a compromise that brought the Grand Tours back onto an expanded World Calendar, including many ASO events.144 Nevertheless,
the UCI still lacks control over the sport’s biggest events and organizers.
Instead, the UCI’s only meaningful recourse is the power it has over the
teams, who need a UCI license and ProTeam registration approved each
year. Consequently, the UCI directs that race organizers must follow UCI
rules or the UCI will punish any UCI licensed team that participates in
the non-sanctioned race. This imbalance of power has been the source of
much of professional cycling’s tension and acrimony.145
Race organizers must also obtain a UCI license to host their events,146
and then apply each year to their respective national federations to have
their races included on the racing calendars.147 In addition, as stated earlier, their races must comply with the UCI’s extensive regulations on the
organization and structure of the race, for example the duration of the
race,148 stage distances,149 total distance of the race,150 the number of rest
days,151 and the awarding of bonus points during the race.152
140. See Henderson, supra note 138; UCI Regulations, Part I, supra note 29, ch. II, art.
1.2.019, at 23 (stating that “[n]o license holder may participate in an event that has not
been included on a national, continental or world calendar or that has not been recognised
by a national federation, a continental federation or the UCI.”).
141. Henderson, supra note 138, at C5.
142. Team Astana, which featured 2007 Tour de France champion Alberto Contador,
was not invited to participate in the 2008 Tour because of doping allegations. See Dan
Harbles, ProTour Teams Take Sides, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Jul. 16, 2008, at 13.
143. Id.
144. Henderson, supra note 138, at C5.
145. See, e.g., Assoc. Press, Cycling Teams Threaten Boycott Over Radio Feud, N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
17,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/sports/cycling/CYCUCIRadioFeud-2.html?_r=1;
Padraig, To Snub or Snipe?, RED KITE PRAYER (Sept. 18, 2010),
http://redkiteprayer.com/?p=3522.
146. UCI Regulations, Part I, supra note 29, ch. I, § 1, art. 1.1.010(1.6), at 3.
147. UCI Regulations, Part I, supra note 29, ch. II, § 1, art. 1.2.006, at 21.
148. Major tours must be between fifteen and twenty-three days. UCI Regulations,
Part II, supra note 28, ch. VI, art. 2.6.007, at 41.
149. The maximum length of a stage is 240 kilometers (148.8 miles). The maximum
average daily distance (not including the prologue) is 180 kilometers (111.6 miles). The
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II. COMPARISON TO AMERICAN SPORTS LEAGUE STRUCTURES
The first part of this Article examined the structure of professional cycling. The second part of the Article will compare that structure to the
structure of America’s four largest, most important, and most successful
professional sports leagues—the National Football League (“NFL”), Major League Baseball (“MLB”), the National Basketball Association
(“NBA”), and the National Hockey League (“NHL”)—collectively
known as the “Big Four”.
In reality, the UCI is most similar to the Professional Golf Association
(“PGA”). The PGA is an organization comprised of approximately
28,000 individual golfers who are certified by the PGA and participate in
PGA events according to PGA rules.153 In addition, the PGA organizes
the PGA Tour—a schedule of events for the elite players in the world.
Based on the golfers’ performance in these events, they are awarded
ranking points similar to the UCI.154 Also like the UCI, the PGA does not
organize every event on the golfing calendar that is calculated into these
rankings. Specifically, the PGA does not host three of golf’s major tournaments: the Masters,155 the U.S. Open,156 and the Open Championship.157 The key difference between the UCI and the PGA is that there is
no team structure whatsoever in professional golf.

maximum distance for an individual time trial is 60 kilometers (37.2 miles). Id. ch. VI,
art. 2.6.008, at 42.
150. The maximum length of a major tour is 3,500 kilometers (2,170 miles). Id. ch. VI,
art. 2.6.011, at 43.
151. In major tours there must be at least two rest days. Id. ch. VI, art. 2.6.012, at 43.
152. Id. ch. VI, art. 2.6.019, at 45–46.
153. See History, PGA OF AMERICA, http://www.pga.com/pga-america/history (last
visited Oct. 5, 2011).
154. For more on the World Golf Ranking system, see How the System Works,
WORLD
GOLF
RANKING,
(Jan.
1,
2011),
OFFICIAL
http://www.officialworldgolfranking.com/about_us/default.sps?iType=425.
155. The Masters Tournament is hosted each year by the Augusta National Golf Club
in Augusta, Georgia. It is the only one of golf’s four majors that does not change venues.
For
more
information,
see
About
the
Masters,
MASTERS,
http://www.masters.com/en_US/discover/about.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).
156. The U.S. Open is held by the United States Golf Association (“USGA”). About
USGA, U.S. GOLF ASS’N, http://www.usga.org/about.aspx?id=7881#show=d161510100df-42fe-97f1-bb9cd1de416c (last visited Oct. 7, 2011). Whereas the PGA is an association of golfers, the USGA is national association of golf courses, clubs, and facilities, and
the governing body of golf for the Untied States and Mexico. See id. Together with the
R&A, the USGA produces and interprets the Rules of Golf. Id.
157. The Open Championship, also known as the British Open, is organized by the
R&A, golf’s governing authority in Europe, formerly part of the Royal & Ancient Golf
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The introduction of the team element is what makes comparing professional cycling to the Big Four worthwhile. These leagues are substantially similar in their structure and operations. Consequently, this Article
focuses on the structure of the NFL whose popularity158 and litigationfilled history make it an interesting case study. Notably, the NFL and its
players reached a new CBA in July 2011 following a contentious labor
dispute. The CBA ultimately reached between the NFL and the players is
believed to be substantially similar to the one that existed from 1993
through March 2011 in cycling, which will provide much of the background for a useful comparison.
A. The National Football League
The NFL is an unincorporated association of thirty-two separately
owned and operated football teams.159 An association, by definition, is an
unincorporated organization that is not a legal entity separate from the
persons composing the organization.160 The structure of the NFL and its
related entities is an oft-litigated topic, most recently before the United
States Supreme Court in American Needle, Inc. v. National Football
League.161 The league operates according to its Bylaws and Constitution,
which are agreed upon by the thirty-two member teams. Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, the United States’ antitrust law, outlaws any contract,

Club at St. Andrews in Scotland. For more information, About the R&A, R&A,
http://www.randa.org/en/RandA.aspx (last visited Oct. 7, 2011).
158. See Super Bowl XLIV Mashes M-A-S-H: Saints Victory over Colts Most-Watched
Program in TV History, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL (W.Va.), Feb. 9, 2010, at B4 (describing how the 2010 Super Bowl was the most watched program in U.S. television history).
159. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 737 (7th Cir. 2008),
rev’d, Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S.Ct. 2201 (2010). American Needle, a hat manufacturer and licensee of NFL trademarks, sued the NFL and its related
entity, NFL Properties (“NFLP”), after NFLP agreed to an exclusive license with Reebok
for the licensing of intellectual property to use on clothing and related merchandise. Id. at
738. Both the district court and Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals granted the NFL summary judgment, ruling that through NFLP, the thirty-two NFL teams were a single-entity
and therefore incapable of violating antitrust law under Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 738–39 (1984). The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that
NFLP was merely an “instrumentality” of the teams and that competitors cannot avoid
antitrust liability by acting through a third-party intermediary or joint venture. Am. Needle, Inc., 130 S.Ct. at 2215. In addition, the court stated that the “teams are acting as separate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests and each team therefore is a
potential independent center of decisionmaking.” Id. at 2213.
160. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 141 (9th ed. 2009).
161. Am. Needle, Inc., 130 S.Ct. at 2204.
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combination, or conspiracy which unreasonably restrains trade.162 Consequently, the Bylaws and Constitution, among other agreements involving the separate teams, have been the basis for many antitrust lawsuits,
including the issues of team ownership,163 team relocation,164 intellectual
property licensing,165 television broadcasts,166 player salaries,167 player
movement,168 and more.169
162. See Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004); see also Standard Oil Co. of
New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 87 (1911) (ruling that only “unreasonable” restraints are illegal).
163. See N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat’l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.
1982) (ruling that the NFL could not enforce a policy prohibiting owners from owning
sports teams in other leagues); see also Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091
(1st Cir. 1994) (ruling that the NFL’s ban against corporate ownership could unreasonably restrain trade. The case was settled prior to a jury determination on remand).
164. See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th
Cir. 1984) (ruling that the NFL’s procedures on franchise relocation were not sufficiently
narrowly tailored in compliance with antitrust law).
165. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S.Ct. 2201, 2212–13 (2010)
(holding that for purposes of licensing their intellectual property, the thirty-two NFL
teams could not be considered a single-entity).
166. See United States v. Nat’l Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 327 (D. Pa. 1953)
(holding that the NFL’s rule prohibiting the televising of outside games into a team’s
home territory when that team is playing an away game to be an “unreasonable and illegal restraint of trade”); see also United States v. Nat’l Football League, 196 F. Supp. 445,
447 (D. Pa. 1961) (ruling that the decision of the NFL’s fourteen member clubs to collectively sell the broadcast rights to their games also violated antitrust law). These decisions
were statutorily overruled by the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–
1295 (1961). See also Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 172 F.3d 299, 303
(3d Cir. 1999) (ruling that the NFL’s deal with DirecTV violated antitrust law).
167. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 251 (1996) (ruling that NFL’s
decision to impose fixed salaries for practice squad players is exempt from antitrust liability under the nonstatutory labor exemption).
168. Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1007 (D. Minn. 1975), aff’d
in relevant part, 543 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1976)(ruling that NFL’s Rozelle Rule was an
unreasonable restraint on player movement, and therefore constituted a violation of antitrust laws); see also White v. Nat’l Football League, 836 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Minn. 1993);
McNeil v. Nat’l Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871, 896 (D. Minn. 1992) (invalidating
NFL’s existing free agency restrictions).
169. Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 451 (1957) (ruling that the
NFL, unlike MLB, is subject to antitrust laws); see also U.S. Football League v. Nat’l
Football League, 644 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d, 842 F.2d 1335, 1340 (2d Cir.
1988) (Although a jury found that the NFL unlawfully monopolized professional football
in the United States, the district court rejected the rest of the USFL’s claims, finding “that
the NFL had neither monopolized a relevant television submarket nor attempted to do so;
that the NFL did not commit any overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy to monopolize;
that the NFL did not engage in a conspiracy in restraint of trade; that the NFL’s television
contracts were not unreasonable restraints of trade; that the NFL did not control access to
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The league has many employees, who essentially work for the thirtytwo teams, to handle the business operations of the league, most notably
the Commissioner. The Commissioner is hired by the teams and the
scope of his power is generally only limited by the terms of the CBA
reached with the players’ union.170 Current NFL Commissioner Roger
Goodell arguably has more power than his fellow Commissioners in
MLB, the NBA, or the NHL. In particular, he has been aggressive in enforcing a personal conduct policy.171
The league serves many important functions for its member teams, including negotiating the CBA with the players’ union (including the drug
testing policy),172 negotiating television contracts,173 providing uniform
rules and regulations for both on-the-field and off-the-field matters,174
the three major television networks; and that the NFL did not interfere either with the
USFL’s ability to obtain a fall television contract or with its spring television contracts.”
As a result, the jury awarded a total of $1 in damages, affirmed on appeal, effectively
ending any chance of the USFL’s resurrection and competition with the NFL.).
170. For cases involving the scope of Commissioner authority, see Rose v. Giamatti,
721 F. Supp. 906, 919 (D. Ohio 1989) (upholding the power of MLB Commissioner Bart
Giamatti to discipline Pete Rose); see also Finley v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 534 (7th Cir.
1978); Milwaukee Am. Ass’n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 301 (D. Ill. 1931); Am. League
Baseball Club of New York v. Johnson, 179 N.Y.S. 498, 503 (Sup. Ct. 1919), aff’d, 190
A.D. 932, 179 N.Y.S. 898 (1920).
171. The following players have all been given suspensions ranging from six games to
a full season or more for various types of illegal and inappropriate conduct: Michael
Vick, Adam “Pacman” Jones, Plaxico Burress, Donte Stallworth, Chris Henry, Tank
Johnson, and Ben Roethlisberger. See D. Orlando Ledbetter, QB Penalty ‘Unprecedented’, ATL. J. CONST., Apr. 22, 2010, at 1C; see also Matthew J. Parlow, Professional
Sports League Commissioners’ Authority and Collective Bargaining, 11 TEX. REV. ENT.
& SPORTS L. 179, 187 (2010).
172. NFL CBA, supra note 114, art. XLIV, § 5, at 197–98; see also Nat’l Football
League, Policy on Anabolic Steroids and Related Substances, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N
(2010),
https://www.nflplayers.com/about-us/Rules—Regulations/PlayerPolicies/Steroid-Policy (follow “Steroid Policy Documentation” hyperlink). The NFL’s
“Policy on Anabolic Steroids and Related Substances” as negotiated with the NFLPA is
separate from the NFL CBA. See id.
173. The thirty-two NFL teams are permitted to sell the rights to their games collectively under the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–1295 (1961). In
2010, the NFL and its member clubs will receive approximately $3.7 billion in television
rights deals from CBS, FOX, NBC, ESPN, and DirecTV. WONG, supra note 124, §
14.2.2, exhibit 14.1, at 719.
174. The NFL has a Competition Committee consisting of coaches, owners, and team
executives to consider on-the-field rule changes. See, e.g., Gerry Fraley, NFL Owners
Decide Not to Change Overtime Format for Regular-Season Games, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS
(May
26,
2010),
http://www.dallasnews.com/sports/dallascowboys/headlines/20100525-NFL-owners-decide-not-to-change-8041.ece. An example
of a recently changed on-the-field rule is that beginning with the 2010 season, in playoff
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enforcing the league rules with respect to teams and players,175 and creating a playing schedule.
By comparison, the UCI performs many of these same functions for
the business of cycling. The key difference being the structure—whereas
the NFL is formed by and through its 32 member teams, the UCI consists
of about 170 member national federations and the teams have little control over the rules, regulations, and operation of professional cycling. In
the NFL, the teams, via the league structure, organize and put on the
roughly 330 NFL games each season.176 In contrast, ProTour teams are
merely participants in cycling events being put on by either the UCI or
an event organizer such as ASO.
B. Teams
While UCI-licensed cycling teams have the AIGCP as their collective
representative, albeit a weak one, the thirty-two NFL teams have the
NFL as their collective association. Whereas almost anyone with the financial resources could put together a cycling team and apply for a UCI
license, entry into the NFL is much more difficult. The existing NFL
clubs must approve any application for a new member franchise and
have the legal right to exclude any owner or organization.177 The most
games only, if a team kicks a field goal on the first possession of overtime, the opposing
team will have a possession to tie or win the game. Id. Previously it was a sudden death
rule where the first team to score won. Id. An example of an important off-the-field rule
is the Rooney Rule. See, e.g., N. Jeremi Duru, The Fritz Pollard Alliance, the Rooney
Rule, and the Quest to “Level the Playing Field” in the National Football League, 7 VA.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 179, 187–96 (2008). The Rooney Rule requires NFL teams to always
interview at least one minority candidate for a head coaching or general manager vacancy. Id. at 189.
175. In recent years NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell has enforced a very strict personal conduct policy for all league personnel. See, e.g., Ledbetter, supra note 171; Carlos
Monarrez, NFL Suspends Lewand for 30 Days, Fines Him, DETROIT FREE PRESS, July 31,
2010, at B1. Several players have been given suspensions for various types of illegal and
inappropriate conduct. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. Team personnel are
also subject to the policy: in 2010, Detroit Lions President Tom Lewand was suspended
for thirty days and fined $100,000 after being arrested on suspicion of drunk driving.
Monarrez, supra.
176. Each of the 32 teams plays 16 regular season games and approximately 4 preseason games. Each game has 2 participating teams, equaling 320 games. In addition, there
are 11 playoff games. See Schedules, NFL, http://www.nfl.com/schedules (last visited
Oct. 7, 2011).
177. See Mid-S. Grizzlies v. Nat’l Football League, 550 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
aff’d, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983). The Memphis Grizzlies, a member club of the defunct
World Football League, sued the NFL for inclusion into the NFL on antitrust grounds. Id.
at 562. The court granted summary judgment for the NFL, finding that there was no
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recent entry into the NFL was the Houston Texans in 2002, founded and
owned by energy billionaire Bob McNair, who paid the existing thirtyone NFL owners a $700 million expansion fee.178
Although MLB, the NBA, and the NHL allow it, the NFL prohibits
corporate ownership of teams.179 Consequently, each NFL team is majority-owned by a particularly wealthy individual, seeing as how NFL franchises are worth an estimated average of over $1 billion.180 Owners typically create some type of limited liability entity that actually owns the
team, the names of which are often only revealed during litigation.181 In
stark contrast, the value of a ProTeam is derived almost entirely from its
sponsorship agreements that are generally in the range of $10 to $20 million.182
One of the keys to the NFL’s success has been its generous revenue
sharing arrangements. In 1961, then NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle
was instrumental in the passage of the federal government’s Sports
Broadcasting Act. The Sports Broadcasting Act immunizes the Big Four
professional leagues and their member teams from antitrust scrutiny in
the collective selling of the television rights to their games.183 With the

showing how competition in any arguably relevant market would be improved if plaintiffs were given a share of the NFL’s monopoly power. Id. at 572.
178. See Richard Sandomir, N.F.L. Goes Back to Houston for $700 Million, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 1999, at D5.
179. Ryan Schaffer, A Piece of the Rock (or the Rockets): The Viability of Widespread
Public Offerings of Professional Sports Franchises, 5 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 201, 209
(2006); see Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994) (ruling that
the NFL’s ban against corporate ownership could unreasonably restrain trade. The case
was settled prior to a jury determination on remand and the policy remains in effect.).
FORBES,
180. Special
Report:
NFL
Team
Valuations,
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2010/30/football-valuations-10_NFL-TeamValuations_Rank.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2011).
181. See Jorge E. Leal Garrett & Bryan A. Green, Considerations for Professional
Sports Teams Contemplating Going Public, 31 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 69, 71, 81, 88–93
(2010).
182. Desbordes, supra note 63, at 403. In addition to the NFL’s no corporate ownership policy, the NFL also prohibits any team or team owner from having any interest in a
gambling operation. See Ed Bouchette, Ownership Deal Closes With 10 New Partners;
Rooneys Close Ownership Deal Rooneys Now Meet League Guidelines, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Sep. 25, 2009, at D1.
183. Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–1295 (1961).
The antitrust laws . . . shall not apply to any joint agreement by or among persons engaging in or conducting the organized professional team sports of football, baseball, basketball, or hockey, by which any league of clubs participating
in professional football, baseball, basketball, or hockey contests sells or otherwise transfers all or any part of the rights of such league’s member clubs in the
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increasing importance of television and television revenues, Rozelle felt
that the only way small market clubs such as the Green Bay Packers
could compete with large clubs such as the New York Giants was if all
teams shared in the television revenues equally. As a result, NFL television rights are a tremendously valuable asset and make up nearly half of
the NFL’s more than $8 billion in annual revenue.184 In professional cycling, because the teams do not put on the events, they have no right to
any of the television revenue.185
In addition to shared television revenues, the NFL and its member
clubs created NFL Properties (“NFLP”) in 1963 to jointly license team
and league intellectual property.186 Again, this is a valuable source of
shared revenue for the thirty-two NFL member teams.187 While NFLP is
mainly concerned with the most lucrative national or international sponsorship deals, teams do have local sponsorship and licensing arrangements, most notably for stadium naming rights.188 While sponsors in professional cycling become the name of the team and dictate the team’s
jersey design, NFL teams only began letting sponsors place logos on
practice jerseys in 2009, insisting that game jerseys are “sacred.”189
Just as the business of professional football is far more lucrative than
that of professional cycling, an NFL club’s operations are vastly more
sponsored telecasting of the games of football, baseball, basketball, or hockey,
as the case may be, engaged in or conducted by such clubs.
Id. § 1291.
184. WONG, supra note 124, § 14.2.2, exhibit 14.1, at 719 (describing NFL’s television
deals worth an approximate $3.7 billion annually); see Ron Borges, Players’ Union Expects ’11 Lockout, BOS. HERALD, Feb. 5, 2010, at 66; Gary Myers, Lookin’ Super Big
Apple Should Get Ready for Big Game, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 23, 2010, at 69.
185. See Daniel Benson, Vaughters Calls for Sharing TV Revenue, CYCLINGNEWS (July
19, 2011), http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/vaughters-calls-for-sharing-tv-revenue.
186. Gabriel Feldman, The Puzzling Persistence of the Single-Entity Argument for
Sports Leagues: American Needle and the Supreme Court’s Opportunity to Reject a
Flawed Defense, 2009 WIS. L. REV 835, 878–79.
187. See, e.g., Beth Hutchens, NFL Players vs. Owners: A Hail Mary of a Lawsuit,
IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 13, 2011, 10:20 AM), http://ipwatchdog.com/2011/03/13/nflplayers-vs-owners-a-hail-mary-of-a-lawsuit/id=15749. However, the value may be diminished in future years based on the ongoing American Needle litigation. See generally Am.
Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S.Ct. 2201, 2215 (2010). The NFL derived
greater revenue from its exclusive license with Reebok—an arrangement that the district
court could find unreasonably restrains trade on remand from the Supreme Court. See
Marc Edelman, Upon Further Review: Will the NFL’s Trademark Licensing Practices
Survive Full Antitrust Scrutiny? The Remand of American Needle v. Nat’l Football
League, 16 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. (forthcoming 2011).
188. See Feldman, supra note 186, at 887–89.
189. Neil Best, Practice Run for Corporate Logos, NEWSDAY, Jul. 31, 2009, at A59.
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complex and involve many more people. A preseason NFL roster has
eighty players. In addition, an NFL team has two dozen coaches and well
over one hundred people working in football operations, finance, human
resources, marketing, public relations, information technology, and
more—not to mention the thousands of people either employed by the
team or by contract to work on game days.
C. Players
Perhaps the largest and most important difference between the structure of professional cycling and that of American sports is the role of the
athletes. In each of the Big Four leagues, there is a corresponding players’ union or players association that fights for and protects the players’
rights pursuant to American labor law:190 the National Football Players
Association (“NFLPA”),191 the Major League Baseball Players Association (“MLBPA”),192 the National Basketball Players Association
(“NBPA”),193 and the National Hockey League Players’ Association
(“NHLPA”).194 The formation, recognition, and strength of the unions
vary,195 but each of them negotiates a CBA with its respective league that

190. See
MAJOR
LEAGUE
BASEBALL
PLAYERS
ASS’N,
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/index.jsp (last visited Oct. 7, 2011); NAT’L BASKETBALL
PLAYERS ASS’N, www.nbpa.com (last visited Oct. 7, 2011); NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE
PLAYERS’ ASS’N, www.nhlpa.com (last visited Oct. 7, 2011); NFL PLAYERS ASS’N,
https://www.nflplayers.com (last visited Oct. 7, 2011). The National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006), protects “the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for
the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual
aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 151.
191. The NFPLA became the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) certified
representative of NFL players in 1970. See History, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N,
http://www.nflplayers.com/about-us/History (last visited Sept. 22, 2011).
192. The MLBPA became the NLRB certified representative of MLB players in 1969.
See Frequently Asked Questions, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASS’N,
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/info/faq.jsp (last visited Sept. 22, 2011).
193. See About the NBPA, NAT’L BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS’N, http://nbpa.org/aboutus (last visited Oct. 7, 2011).
194. See About Us, NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS’ ASS’N, http://nhlpa.com/AboutUs (last visited Oct. 7, 2011).
195. See WONG, supra note 124, § 11.3, at 529–71, for more information on the formation, recognition and strength of the various unions.
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governs the terms and conditions of employment,196 as well as many other matters.197
Although most fans only pay attention to the CBAs when the failure to
agree to one threatens play,198 CBAs are the core around which the
league, teams, the union, players, coaches, agents, and others base their
actions. The recently expired 301-page NFL-NFLPA CBA contemplated
almost all the activities which would affect a player, including the entry
draft,199 minimum salaries,200 practice limits,201 team and league discipline,202 free agency,203 limits on player compensation,204 player benefits
196. Certain subjects are considered “mandatory” subjects of bargaining, including pay
rates, discipline, drug testing, safety, grievance procedures, benefits, and severance compensation. See WONG, supra note 124, § 11.2.2, at 527.
197. In addition to “mandatory” subjects, the parties are free to negotiate on “permissive” subjects of bargaining, such as a change in the bargaining unit, the status of supervisors, settlement of unfair labor practice charges, or internal union or company affairs.
Id.
198. In the NFL, the players went on strike during training camp in 1970, 1974, and
1975, though no regular season games were lost. Paul D. Staudohar, The Football Strike
of 1987: The Question of Free Agency, MONTHLY LAB. R., Aug. 1988, at 26 [hereinafter
Staudohar, Football Strike]; Kevin Jackman & Bobby Mette, NFL Lockout: An In-Depth
Look at Past Labor Disputes in Sports, B/R BLEACHER REP. (June 5, 2011),
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/724433-nfl-lockout-an-in-depth-look-at-past-labordiputes-in-sports-current-nfl-issue; Evan Weiner, Countdown to the Real Kickoff—the
NFL Lockout in 2011, DAILY CALLER (Mar. 10, 2010, 11:56 AM),
http://dailycaller.com/2010/03/01/countdown-to-the-real-kickoff-%e2%80%93-the-nfllockout-in-2011. During the 1982 season the players went on a fifty-seven-day strike that
reduced the regular season to nine games. WONG, supra note 124, § 11.3.3, at 531; Ray
Fittipaldo, History Shows Team Unity During A Work Stoppage is Harbinger of Later
Success, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 14, 2011, at D.1. The players struck for twenty-four days during the 1987 season, reducing the regular season to fifteen games. Jackman & Mette, supra. In MLB, players went on strike in 1972, 1980, 1981, 1985, and
1994–95, the last costing baseball its first missed World Series since 1905. Aaron Couch,
Five Worst Labor Disputes in Sports, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, (Mar. 11, 2011),
http://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/content/view/print/367362. Owners locked the
players out in 1973, 1976, and 1990. Jackman & Mette, supra. In the NBA, the players
have never gone on strike, but the owners locked the players out in 1995, 1996, and
1998–99. WONG, supra note 124, § 11.3.4, at 533. In the NHL, the players went on a tenday strike in 1992 and the owners locked the players out in 1994–95 and 2004–05, costing the league an entire season. Both Sides of NHL Labor Dispute Had Winners and Losers, VANCOUVER SUN, Jan. 14, 1995, at A.14; Couch, supra; Alan Adams, Officials Fear
NHL Lockout Tarnishing Game, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Nov. 20, 1994, at D.3.
199. See NFL CBA, supra note 114, art. XVI, at 46–50.
200. See id. art. XXXVIII, at 179–82.
201. See id. art. XXXVII, § 5, at 177.
202. See id. art. VIII, at 19–22 & art. XI, at 34–35.
203. See id. art. XIX, at 57–67.
204. See id. art. XXIV, at 82–144.
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and insurance,205 the standard player contract,206 grievance procedures,207
severance pay,208 and more. The legal basis for the players and teams to
reach such a complex agreement will be discussed in more detail later.
In contrast, the Joint Agreements negotiated between the riders union,
CPA, and the AIGCP is ten pages, covering only the most basic provisions, such as minimum salaries,209 bonus and prize money,210 minimum
vacation days,211 and health insurance.212 Notably, the Joint Agreements
do not address drug testing. Not surprisingly, the CPA has little to no
budget and few, if any, full-time employees.213 In contrast, the NFLPA
has over one hundred employees in a variety of capacities, notably Players Inc., the union’s marketing arm, and a small army of experienced and
talented attorneys led by Executive Director DeMaurice Smith.214
Free agency has historically been the most important issue for American team sport athletes.215 The path to true free agency in the NFL was a
little longer than in other Big Four sports; the NFLPA made the questionable decision to give up free agency during collective bargaining negotiations in 1977 in return for an increase in pay, pensions, and benefits.216 After a contentious legal battle that saw the NFLPA decertified as
the official bargaining representative of the players amidst several antitrust lawsuits,217 the NFLPA and NFL agreed to a substantially changed
205. See id. art. XLIV, at 197–98 & art. XLIX, at 218–20.
206. See id. art. XIV, § 7, app. C, at 248–56.
207. See id. art. IX–X, at 23–33.
208. See id. art. XXXV, § 8, app. L, at 288.
209. UCI Regulations, Joint Agreements, supra note 103, ch. II, art. 10, at 172–73.
210. Id. ch. II, arts. 11–14, at 173–77.
211. Riders are entitled to a minimum of thirty-five vacation days per year. Id. ch. II,
art. 17, at 174.
212. Id. ch. II, arts. 22–23, at 173–74.
213. Interview with John Wilcockson, supra note 69.
214. Smith was elected as Executive Director in 2009 following the death of long-time
Executive Director and Hall of Fame player Eugene Upshaw. Larry Weisman, Players
Lose Leader; Football Loses Legend; Gene Upshaw, Dead at 63, Leaves Major Mark on
Sport, USA TODAY, Aug. 22, 2008, at C.1; Executive Director, NFL PLAYER’S ASS’N,
https://www.nflplayers.com/About-us/NFLPA-Officers/Executive-Director (last visited
Oct. 7, 2011) [hereinafter NFLPA Executive Director]. Prior to joining the NFLPA,
Smith was a trial lawyer and litigation partner at D.C. law firm Patton Boggs, where he
concentrated on white-collar criminal defense and tort liability trials. NFLPA Executive
Director, supra. He also previously served as Counsel to then Deputy Attorney General
Eric Holder in the U.S. Department of Justice before entering private practice. Id.
215. See, e.g., Deubert & Wong, supra note 116, at 183–91 (describing a period of
rapid growth in the NFL following the first CBA granting unrestricted free agency).
216. Id. at 186.
217. Id. at 188. In 1987, Marvin Powell, other players, and the NFLPA sued the NFL
challenging the player movement restrictions. The Eighth Circuit ruled that because the
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NFL CBA in 1993, implementing a salary cap and unrestricted free
agency for players who have at least four Accrued Seasons.218 Players
with three Accrued Seasons are free agents subject to certain restrictions
and compensation for his original team.219 Players with less than three
Accrued Seasons are the exclusive property of their current club provided the current club makes them an offer in compliance with the CBA.220
The ability of teams to control players for their earliest years in the
league is generally referred to as the Reserve System.221
Obviously an important part of a player’s free agency is negotiation
with new teams. Whereas in professional cycling a rider negotiates his
next contract while still under his current one, such actions are strictly
forbidden in the NFL. A team may not negotiate with a player or his
agent until his contract has expired at the conclusion of the league year,
on or around March 1.222 Doing so is impermissible tampering and can

players were still unionized, the nonstatutory labor exemption from antitrust laws still
applied and would continue to apply so long as there was a possibility that proceedings
could still be brought before the NLRB. See Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 930 F.2d
1293, 1303–04 (8th Cir. 1989). Based on the Eighth Circuit’s recommendation, the
NFLPA decertified and players brought another antitrust suit, in which the district court
agreed that the NFL’s most recent incarnation of the Rozelle Rule, Plan B free agency
system, was an unreasonable restraint of trade. See McNeil v. Nat’l Football League, 790
F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992). Next, NFL players, led by Reggie White, brought a suit
for treble damages under antitrust law. White v. Nat’l Football League, 836 F. Supp.
1458, 1461 (D. Minn. 1993). The case was settled as the modern NFL-NFLPA CBA was
reached. Id. at 1462; Jarrett Bell, Timeline of NFL Labor Disputes, U.S.A. TODAY (Mar.
12, 2011), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2011-03-03-nfl-labor-disputestimeline_N.htm.
218. See NFL CBA, supra note 114, art. XIX, § 1(a), at 57. A player earns an “Accrued Season” when he is on full pay status for six or more regular season games. Id. art
XVIII, § 1(a), at 56.
219. Id. art XIX, § 2(a), at 58.
220. Id. art XVII, § 2, at 56.
221. See WONG, supra note 124, at 847 (refer to the “Reserve Clause” glossary term).
222. In 2008, the NFL took away the San Francisco 49ers fifth-round draft pick for
tampering with Chicago Bears linebacker Lance Briggs. See Vaughn McClure, 49ers Still
Pay for Briggs, Tampering Charge Costs Them a Pick, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 25, 2008, at 2.
There have been many other suspected cases of tampering in recent years including: the
New York Jets in 2009 with 49ers wide receiver Michael Crabtree, in 2009 the Washington Redskins with former Tennessee Titans defensive lineman Albert Haynesworth, and
in 2008 the Minnesota Vikings with Green Bay Packers quarterback Brett Favre. See
John Crumpacker, Tampering Charges Likely Aimed at Jets, S.F. CHRON., Sep. 22, 2009,
at B1; Ryan O’Halloran, Nearly Tamper Proof, Violations in NFL Are Hard to Substantiate, WASH. TIMES (D.C.), Mar. 13, 2009, at C02; Jason Wilde, Packers File Tampering
Charge; They Claim Vikings Coach Darrell Bevell Had “Inappropriate Dialogue” with
the QB, WIS. ST. J., Jul. 17, 2008, at F1.
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result in punishment by the Commissioner in the form of forfeited draft
picks and/or a fine.223
One of the principal ways in which players move between teams is by
trades, in which players are exchanged for each other. Trades are less
common in the NFL than other American sports because of salary cap
complications,224 but do occur frequently. Trades, which are the legal
assignment of a player’s contract to another team in exchange for the
same, do not occur in professional cycling. Furthermore, when they do
occur in European sports, they generally occur as part of a transfer
agreement in which a significant sum of cash is involved. American
sports generally do not allow for the sale of players.225
In recent years, one of the most contentious issues for NFL players and
NFL alumni has been their disability benefits and health insurance.226 As
stories of former players suffering from serious and permanent injuries
and disabilities have become commonplace, the NFL has been forced by
public perception and government rebuke227 to increase its funding to
retired players228 while also doing more to prevent serious injuries to current players.229

223. See McClure, supra note 222.
224. See Ari Nissim, Note, The Trading Game: NFL Free Agency, The Salary Cap,
and Proposal for Greater Trading Flexibility, 11 SPORTS LAW. J. 257, 266–67 (2004).
Nissim is currently the Director of Football Administration for the New York Jets. Ari
Nissim on 1050 ESPN Inside the Jets, N.Y. JETS, http://www.newyorkjets.com/medialounge/videos/Ari-Nissim-on-1050-ESPN-Inside-the-Jets/a7b7d62a-8688-4d19-814efc14ee5356cc (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).
225. In 1976, Oakland Athletics owner Charlie Finley attempted to sell star pitcher
Vida Blue to the New York Yankees and left fielder and pitcher Rollie Fingers to the
Boston Red Sox rather than lose them to the newly established free agency in baseball.
See Charles O. Finley & Co., Inc. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 530–31 (7th Cir. 1978). MLB
Commissioner Bowie Kuhn vetoed the deals as not in the best interests of baseball. Id. at
531. Finley sued, but a federal court upheld Commissioner Kuhn’s powers. See id. at 543.
226. See Erika A. Diehl, Note, What’s All the Headache?: Reform Needed to Cope
with the Effects of Concussions in Football, 23 J.L. & HEALTH 83, 114–116 (2010); Daniel J. Kain, Note, “It’s Just a Concussion”: The National Football League’s Denial of a
Causal Link Between Multiple Concussions and Later-Life Cognitive Decline, 40
RUTGERS L.J. 697, 697 (2009); Brett Edwin LoVellette, Comment, “Mortal Kombat in
Cleats”: An Examination of the National Football League’s Disability Plan and Its Impact on Retired Players, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1101, 1106 (2009).
227. The House Judiciary Committee has held two hearings (one in October 2009 and
one in May 2010) on concussions in football and the NFL’s lackluster response. Barry
Wilner, House Has Say on Concussions, STAR-LEDGER (N.J.), May 25, 2010, at 32.
228. See Wayne Coffey, When the Cheers Stop. After Giving His Body to the NFL,
Jimmie Giles Is in Fight of His Life, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 27, 2009, at 78; Mike Herndon, Bennett Tackles New Challenge, PRESS-REGISTER (Ala.), Jul. 15, 2010, at B3; Fred
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NFL players earn substantially more than professional cyclists. NFL
players’ minimum salaries are based on their level of experience and
other contractual arrangements,230 but generally, in 2010, the minimum
salary was $320,000, nearly eight times that of a ProTour rider.231
III. LEGAL BASIS FOR IMPROVING PROFESSIONAL CYCLING
Team and rider continuity is essential to the health of professional cycling. Although fans have their favorite riders and the sport is individual
in its trophies, the sport is a team sport and the health of the business of
cycling depends on the health of its teams. However, from 2001 to 2010,
on average, 52% of the riders of the Tour de France were either new riders or with a new team as compared to the previous year’s Tour.232 On
average, a team returning to the Tour from the previous year did so with
four new riders out of a team of nine.233 Although this turnover could be
from a variety of factors, such as retirement, injury, skill, or doping bans,
the fact that large percentages of riders change teams and teams change
names each year makes the sport difficult for fans to follow.
If a sponsor is going to derive meaningful benefit from its association
with a team, it will want that team to develop a consistent fan base. An
important part of developing a consistent fan base is having consistency
within the team roster and nomenclature—if teams are changing sponsors every year or two, it becomes difficult to remember who all the
teams are and who all of their riders are as well. On average, three out of
the twenty-one teams that started each Tour de France from 2001
through 2010 were not in the previous year’s race.234 In addition, during
Mitchell, Former Players to Get More Aid; Gridiron Greats Fund Secures Commitments
for Medical Assistance, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 28, 2009, at C2.
229. In 2010 the NFL donated $1 million to help study the long-term effects of playing
football and the related brain trauma. See Alan Schwarz, N.F.L. Gives $1 Million to Brain
Researchers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2010, at B14. Also, beginning with the 2010 season,
all NFL locker rooms have a poster warning players of the long-term effects of multiple
concussions. Editorial, Are You Ready for Some Football?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2010, at
WK7.
230. Players can sign “split” contracts whereby they earn a lower amount if they are
not on the club’s Active/Inactive List, i.e. on injured reserve. NFL CBA, supra note 114,
art. XXXVIII, § 14, at 181. A player’s minimum salary increased approximately $75,000
for each Credited Season. Id. § 6, at 179.
231. Id.; UCI Regulations, Joint Agreements, supra note 103.
232. See generally Races & Results: Tour de France Previous Years, CYCLINGNEWS,
http://www.cyclingnews.com/tour-de-france (last visited Sept. 23, 2011) (This data was
calculated by examining the Start Lists from the 2001 to 2010 Tours de France.).
233. Id.
234. See Tour de France 2000; Startlist, Participating Teams and Riders, VIVELO
BIKES, http://tour.cyclingfever.com/editie.html?detp=view&_ap=startlijst&editie_id=448
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the same time period, an average of 4.3 teams entered the Tour with at
least one new or changed principal sponsor from the previous year.235
Consequently, about a third (3 plus 4.3) of the Tour’s teams are not readily apparent or distinguishable in their identities each year.
There are a number of areas in which professional cycling could be
improved through the adoption, application, or replication of some typical American sport features, including team collaboration, free agency,
contractual creativity, and revenue generation. European labor and antitrust or competition law play an important role in these areas. Many of
these issues can be dealt with through collective bargaining as in American sports.
A. Labor Relations in Professional Cycling, the United States and the EC
The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) governs the relationship
between employers and employees under American labor law.236 Specifically, the NLRA protects “the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment or other mutual aid or protection.”237 Furthermore, the
Clayton Act statutorily exempts organized labor from antitrust law.238
This exemption applies most importantly to Section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, which prohibits any contract, combination, or conspiracy
that unreasonably retrains trade,239 and Section 2, which prohibits the
attempted monopolization of trade or commerce.240

(follow “2001” hyperlink to view startlist for 2001 Tour de France; follow “2002” hyperlink to view startlist for 2002 Tour de France; etc.) (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
235. Id.
236. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006).
237. Id. § 151.
238. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006).
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and
operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the
purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit,
or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully
carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the
members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
Id.
239. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); see also Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S.
36 (1977); Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 87 (1911).
240. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
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In American sports leagues, there are many agreements among the
leagues’ member clubs that would generally draw antitrust scrutiny under Section 1. For example, the thirty-two NFL teams agree to ways to
control salaries through the use of a salary cap,241 maximum contract
lengths for rookies,242 and a minimum number of years experience that a
player must accrue before he can become a free agent.243 These agreements are exempt from antitrust law by reaching a CBA with the players’
union, as will be explained in more detail below.
In cycling, race organizers such as ASO, as the most financially solvent bodies, have tremendous power in the sport of cycling. In addition,
the UCI sets nearly all of the substantive regulations for the sport.244
However, the only two bodies that have the legal authority to control the
terms and conditions of rider employment are the riders’ union, the CPA,
and the employing teams, the AIGCP.
Articles 11 and 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union govern the right of EU employees to unionize and bargain
collectively.245 Article 11 states that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom
of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association at all levels, in particular in political, trade union and civic matters, which implies the right
of everyone to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his or
her interests.”246 Furthermore, Article 28 provides that “[w]orkers and
employers, or their respective organisations, have . . . the right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels and, in
cases of conflicts of interest, to take collective action to defend their interests, including strike action.247
Whereas the NLRA directs that employees and employers should negotiate over the “terms and conditions of their employment,”248 EC law
has no such mandate. American labor law states or has ruled that certain
topics are mandatory subjects of bargaining, such as wages and hours249
241. See generally NFL CBA, supra note 114, art. XXIV, at 82 (detailing the NFL’s
“guaranteed league-wide salary, salary-cap, [and] minimum team salary”).
242. Id. art. XVII, § 5, at 55. Players drafted in the first sixteen picks can sign deals of
six years in length. Id. Players drafted in the second half of the first round can sign contracts up to five years in length. Id. All other rookies are limited to contracts of four years
in length. Id.
243. See infra text accompanying notes 255–62.
244. UCI Constitution, supra note 14, ch. I, art. 2, at 1.
245. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, arts. 11, 28, 2007 O.J. (C
303).
246. Id. art. 11, at 5.
247. Id. art. 28, at 8.
248. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
249. Id.
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and drug testing,250 while all others are merely permissive subjects of
bargaining.251
As discussed earlier, the Joint Agreements between the riders’ CPA
and the teams’ AIGCP is a weak and short document. The CPA and the
AIGCP failed to take advantage of their potential to control their livelihoods by exercising their rights to reach an agreement on all the substantive issues in professional cycling, as is done in American sports. The
two groups instead acquiesce their legal power and rights to the UCI and
the race organizers.
Again, the teams do not host events from which to draw revenue, as
they do in American sports. Consequently, the teams are unstable economic entities with little ability to enforce their rights. At the same time,
the riders are modestly paid employees in an unstable profession who
likely choose instead to play by the existing rules rather than create career-threatening controversy. However, several professional athletes have
essentially sacrificed parts of their career for the betterment of their
brethren, including Jean-Marc Bosman, as discussed earlier, and Curt
Flood in MLB.252 Professional cycling needs a rider or riders willing to
fight for the best interests of the riders, while the teams too must be willing to fight for their share of the control.

250. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 491 U.S. 299 (1989); see also
Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. 180 (1989).
251. See Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co. v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 491 U.S.
490, 491 (1989) (ruling that employer did not have to bargain with union over decision to
sell company assets); First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 452 U.S. 666, 687 (1981)
(ruling that employer had no duty to bargain with union over decision to terminate a contract with one of its commercial customers purely for economic reasons); N.L.R.B. v.
Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 362 (1958) (ruling that a union
recognition clause was not a mandatory subject of bargaining).
252. Flood was an All-Star outfielder for the St. Louis Cardinals in the 1960s. See
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 264 (1972). In October 1969, Flood was traded to the Philadelphia Phillies. Id. at 265. Flood refused to go to Philadelphia, id. at 266, in part because he, an African-American, believed the Phillies had racist fans. Howard Burns,
Flood’s Sacrifice Sports’ Most Meaningful Trade, SPORT’S COUCH POTATO (July 13,
2011), http://sportscouchpotato.com/2014/flood. Flood sued MLB Commissioner Bowie
Kuhn and MLB challenging baseball’s reserve clause as a violation of antitrust laws.
Flood, 407 U.S. at 265. The case eventually reached the United States Supreme Court,
which ruled against Flood based on baseball’s judicially created antitrust exemption established fifty years earlier in Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200
(1922). Flood, 407 U.S. at 282–85. Flood never reported to the Phillies and played only
thirteen more games with the Washington Senators in 1971 after sitting out the entire
1970 season. Id. at 266.
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Certainly the collective bargaining relationship has caused several
painful work stoppages in American sports,253 but through the adversarial
process, unions and leagues have been successful in creating tremendously lucrative partnerships.254
As mentioned earlier, in the United States, the joint activity of employees through union conduct is statutorily exempt from antitrust law.255 The
joint activity and agreements of multiple employers, such as the thirtytwo NFL teams, can also be exempt from antitrust law in collective bargaining negotiations with a union. This exemption is known as the nonstatutory labor exemption and has been developed through case law.256
The necessary conditions for satisfaction of the exemption were definitively laid out in the context of the NFL labor situation in Mackey v. Na253. NFL players went on strike from September 21 through November 16, 1982—
reducing the season to nine games, Gene Wojciechowski, NFL Strike: 1982; A History
Lesson Not Learned, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1987, at 1; Len Pasquarelli, Lengthy Strike
Has
Mostly
Been
Forgotten,
ESPN
(Sept.
21,
2007),
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/columns/story?columnist=pasquarelli_len&id=3030311;
NFL players went on strike from September 22 through October 15, 1987—forcing the
NFL to use replacement players for weeks four through six, Staudohar, Football Strike,
supra note 198, at 28–30; MLB players went on strike from August 12, 1994 through
March 31, 1995—forcing the first-ever cancellation of the World Series, WONG, supra
note 124, § 11.3.5, at 534; Paul D. Staudohar, The Baseball Strike of 1994–95, MONTHLY
LAB. R., Mar. 1997, at 25–26; Couch, supra note 198; NBA owners locked the players
out from July 1, 1998 through January 6, 1999—significantly shortening the regular season, WONG, supra note 124, § 11.3.4, at 533; Paul D. Staudohar, Labor Relations in Basketball: The Lockout of 1998–99, MONTHLY LAB. R., Apr. 1999, at 5, 8; NHL owners
locked the players from September 16, 2004 through July 13, 2005—canceling an entire
season, Paul D. Staudohar, The Hockey Lockout of 2004–05, MONTHLY LAB. R., Dec.
2005, at 23, 26, 27.
254. See, e.g., Chris Isidore, Baseball Close to Catching NFL as Top $ Sport, CNN
MONEY
(Oct.
25,
2007),
http://
money.cnn.com/2007/10/25/commentary/sportsbiz/index.htm (stating that in 2007 MLB generated over $6 billion in revenue); John Lombardo, NBA Increases Shared Revenue by 63
BUS.
J.
(Apr.
28,
2008),
Percent,
SPORTS
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2008/04/20080428/This-WeeksNews/NBA-Increases-Shared-Revenue-By-63-Percent.aspx (noting that “the NBA’s total
revenue-sharing pool increase[d] by 63 percent”). Tripp Mickle, Escrow Cash Will Boost
BUS.
J.
(Mar.
2,
2009),
NHL,
SPORTS
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2009/03/20090302/This-WeeksNews/Escrow-Cash-Will-BoostNHL.aspx?hl=%22escrow%20cash%20will%20boost%20NHL%22&sc=0 (noting that in
2009, the NHL is generated approximately $2.64 billion).
255. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006).
256. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 676, 710 (1965) (“[I]n
order to effectuate congressional intent, collective bargaining activity concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining under the Labor Act is not subject to the antitrust laws.”).
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tional Football League.257 In Mackey, NFL players challenged the NFL’s
Rozelle Rule, which allowed Commissioner Rozelle to determine the
compensation paid to a free agent’s former team if he signed with a new
team.258 The Eighth Circuit stated that for the conduct of joint employers
to be protected by the non-statutory labor exemption, (1) “the restraint on
trade [must] primarily affect[] only the parties to the [CBA],” (2) the issue must “concern a mandatory subject of bargaining,” and (3) the issue
must have been achieved through “bona fide arm’s-length bargaining.”259
This non-statutory labor exemption has served as the backbone for negotiations between American player unions and leagues. Probably the
greatest leverage any of the unions have in collective bargaining negotiations is the threat that they will decertify their union and sue the league
on antitrust grounds when the non-statutory labor exemption no longer
applies.260 EC law does not provide a statutory exemption from antitrust
law for either unions or joint employers. However, EC law has developed a non-statutory labor exemption upon which a meaningful collective bargaining agreement in professional cycling can be based.261

257. Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976).
258. Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 (D. Minn. 1975), aff’d
in relevant part, 543 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1976).
259. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
260. In 1989, the NFLPA decertified as the official bargaining unit of NFL players,
permitting NFL players to successfully bring an antitrust suit against the NFL challenging
its free agency restrictions. See McNeil v. Nat’l Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871, 896
(D. Minn. 1992). Thereafter, future Hall of Fame defensive end Reggie White led a class
action lawsuit against the NFL for treble damages under antitrust laws. White v. Nat’l
Football League, 836 F. Supp. 1458, 1461 (D. Minn. 1993). The White suit led to a $200
million settlement and the NFL CBA that lasted from 1993 through the 2010 season. See
Will McDonough, Tentative Deal Reached In NFL Free Agency Among Concessions
Made by Owners to NFL Players, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 23, 1992, at 59. The NFLPA later
recertified as the representative of the players but following a breakdown in NFL-NFLPA
labor negotiations in 2011, the NFLPA decertified again and immediately filed a class
action antitrust lawsuit. Brady v. Nat’l Football League, No. 11-cv-00639, 2011 WL
1535240, at *2 (D. Minn. Apr. 25, 2011). That lawsuit was settled as part of a new CBA
in July 2011 and the NFLPA shortly thereafter recertified as the official bargaining representative of NFL players. NFL Lockout Timeline, USA TODAY (July 21, 2011, 9:43 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2011-07-21-lockout-timeline_n.htm.
261. The preeminent article on this topic is Marc Edelman & Brian Doyle, Antitrust
and “Free Movement” Risks of Expanding U.S. Professional Sports Leagues into Europe, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 403, 419–20 (2009).
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B. EC Competition Law and the Non-Statutory Labor Exemption
There are two main provisions of EC competition (antitrust) law from
which a non-statutory labor exemption will enable a successful collective
bargaining agreement in professional cycling.
i. Article 101 of the TFEU
Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(“TFEU”) (formerly Article 81), is very similar to Section 1 of the Sherman Act under American antitrust law.262 Article 101(1) prohibits “all
agreements . . . decisions . . . and concerted practices which may affect
trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal
market . . . .”263 Article 101(1) goes on to list specific conduct that is
prohibited, including fixing prices,264 limiting production,265 the sharing
of markets,266 treating trade partners differently,267 and conditioning the
conclusion of a contract on supplementary obligations.268
Agreements in violation of Article 101(1) are “automatically void,”269
in the same sense that, under American law, “certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of
any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and
therefore illegal” per se.270 However, EC case law has also found that “a
rule which at first sight appears to contain a restriction that is necessary

262. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art.
101, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 88 [hereinafter TFEU], available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm; Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). Likewise, Article 102 is very similar to Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Compare
TFEU art. 102, with Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
263. TFEU art. 101(1).
264. Id. art. 101(1)(a).
265. Id. art. 101(1)(b).
266. Id. art. 101(1)(c).
267. See id. art. 101(1)(d).
268. Id. art. 101(1)(e).
269. Id. art. 101(2).
270. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); see also Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982) (holding that maximum prices are illegal
per se); Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 312 U.S. 457, 465
(1941) (holding that group boycotts aimed at non-cooperating retailers or manufacturers
are illegal per se); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940)
(holding price fixing illegal per se).
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in order to make that competition possible in the first place, it must be
assumed that rule does not infringe Article [101(1)].”271
Article 101(3) also provides that certain agreements or practices may
not violate Article 101(1) if they contribute “to improving the production
or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress,
while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit.”272 In addition, the agreements (1) must be “indispensable to the attainment of
[Article 101(1)’s] objectives,” and (2) cannot provide the possibility of
eliminating a substantial portion of competition for the product in question.273
ii. Article 45 of the TFEU
Article 45 (formerly Article 39) of the TFEU secures the freedom of
movement for workers.274 The law forbids employment “discrimination
based on nationality between workers of the Member States.”275 This
statute was also part of the basis for the Bosman ruling discussed earlier,
since at the time the Union of European Football Associations had rules
limiting the number of non-nationals that could be on a team, at the time
Manchester United, an English team playing in the English Premier
League, was only allowed to have five non-English players on its
team.276 As a result of the Bosman ruling, FIFA, through negotiations
with the EC, has changed many of its rules so as to comply with EC
law.277
The ECJ has stated that the free movement of workers is a fundamental
right under EC law,278 and that any agreement restricting such rights will
not be exempt based on a purported non-statutory labor exemption.279
This absolute view of workers rights does not exist in American law and
limits available remedial measures for professional cycling.

271. Edelman & Doyle, supra note 261, at 418 (citing Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-04921, ¶
265).
272. TFEU art. 101(3).
273. See Edelman & Doyle, supra note 246, at 418 (citing TFEU art. 101(3)(a)–(b)).
274. TFEU art. 45(1).
275. Id. art. 45(2).
276. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-04921, ¶ 27.
277. Jean-Christian Drolet, Extra Time: Are the New FIFA Transfer Rules Doomed?,
INT’L SPORTS L.J., Jan.–Apr. 2006, at 66, 66.
278. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-04921, ¶ 92; Edelman & Doyle, supra note 261, at 423.
279. Edelman & Doyle, supra note 261, at 423.
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iii. The Non-Statutory Labor Exemption in the EC
To establish a non-statutory labor exemption under EC law, a defendant must establish that (1) a CBA exists between management and labor,
(2) the CBA was conducted in good faith, (3) on core subjects of collective bargaining, and (4) that the CBA does not directly affect third markets and third parties.280 The first three prongs are substantially similar to
the Mackey Test in American law. The fourth prong is unique to EC law
and may contradict American labor law that allows unions to negotiate
CBA provisions, which affect persons not yet a part of the bargaining
unit.281 As a result of this fourth prong, certain agreements common in
the Big Four CBAs, such as minimum age requirements282 and drafts,283
would probably not be legal in the EC.284

280. Id. at 430 (citing Case C-222/98, Van der Woude v. Stichting Beatrixoord, 2000
E.C.R. I–7111, ¶¶ 22–27; Case C-67/96, Albany Int’l BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, 1999 E.C.R. I–5751, ¶ 296).
281. Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954, 960 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing 29
U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006)); see also Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 379 U.S.
203, 210–15 (1964); Time-O-Matic, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 264 F.2d 96, 99 (7th Cir. 1959);
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 191 F.2d 483, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1951). In
Wood, Leon Wood, a first round pick in the 1984 NBA Draft sued the NBA and NBPA
claiming that the CBA between the two parties, including a salary cap and draft, violated
antitrust laws as it applied to Wood because it was agreed to before Wood was a member
of the NBPA. 809 F.2d at 958, 960. The court disagreed and ruled that the CBA was
protected by the non-statutory labor exemption and Wood was subject to its provisions.
Id. at 906–64.
282. The NBA requires all players to be at least nineteen years old, and if he’s American, at least one NBA season must have elapsed since he graduated (or should have graduated) high school. NBA CBA, supra note 114, art. X, § 1(b)(1), at 225. The NFL requires that at least “three NFL regular seasons have begun and ended following either his
graduation from high school or graduation of the class with which he entered high school,
whichever is earlier.” NFL CBA, supra note 114, art. XVI, § 2(b), at 46. Prior to the 2006
extension of the CBA, this rule was not specifically in the CBA but instead only in the
NFL Bylaws and Constitution. Michael A. McCann & Joseph S. Rosen, Legality of Age
Restrictions in the NBA and the NFL, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731, 732–33 (2006). After
the Maurice Clarett lawsuit, Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379
(S.D.N.Y.), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), the NFL and
NFLPA negotiated the inclusion of the rule into the CBA. McCann & Rosen, supra at
744.
283. All of the Big Four leagues have drafts through which most of its players enter
the league. See First-Year Player Draft Rules, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL,
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/rules.jsp (last visited Oct. 7, 2011); NBA CBA, supra
note 114, art. X, § 1(a), at 225; NFL CBA, supra note 114, pmbl., at 3; NHL CBA, supra
note 114, art. 8, § 8.1, at 17.
284. See Edelman & Doyle, supra note 261, at 424.
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In addition to these specific CBA provisions, American sports leagues
contain many other provisions, such as salary caps and free agency restrictions, that would likely violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act if not
for the non-statutory labor exemption. Accordingly, these provisions
would also likely violate Article 101(1) of the TFEU—though some
would be exempt by the EC non-statutory labor exemption or even the
exemption described in Article 101(3).
However, unlike in American labor law, employers and unions cannot
collectively bargain away an employee’s fundamental right to “free
movement” under Article 45. Consequently, a cycling team’s ability to
control a young rider for the first couple of years through a draft or reserve system is questionable.
Nevertheless, professional cycling teams should consider adopting
many of the provisions or practices of American sports leagues. Many of
the issues needing attention can be resolved through a CBA between the
CPA and the AIGCP pursuant to the EC non-statutory labor exemption.
However, the proposed reforms will require careful compliance with Articles 101 and 45 of the TFEU.
Having established the legal framework within which the professional
cycling world must work to improve, this Article will now discuss some
of the specific aspects of professional cycling operations which should be
modified, abolished, or created.
IV. AREAS OF IMPROVEMENT
A. Improve Team Collaboration
Each cycling team is an independent entity with no relationship to the
other teams outside of the loosely bound and weak AIGCP. As a result of
the issues discussed in this Article, team turnover is quite common. Furthermore, because the UCI only issues eighteen ProTour licenses, teams
are in competition off the road as well. Nevertheless, team continuity and
stability are essential to drawing and maintaining fan interest, and ultimately the sport’s health. Collaboration among teams could help to consolidate resources and to form a united front on issues important to the
teams during discussions with riders, the UCI, and race organizers.
The NFL, NBA, and NHL have salary caps that limit the amount of
money a team can spend on its players.285 The agreements among the
285. See NFL CBA, supra note 114, art. XXIV, § 4, at 96–102 (setting salary cap at
58% of Total Revenues in 2010); NBA CBA, supra note 114, art. VII, § 2 at 120–25
(setting salary cap at 51% of Basketball-Related Income in 2011–2012); NHL CBA,
supra note 114, art. 50, § 50.4, at 193–197 (designating Players’ Share as 54–57% of
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teams to restrict player salaries would violate Section 1 of the Sherman
Act but can exist so long as the salary cap is agreed to as part of a CBA
pursuant to the non-statutory labor exemption. The players associations
agree to the caps in exchange for a guarantee that the players will receive
a minimum percentage of certain league revenues.286 While the guarantees are relatively modest (50% in the NFL, 75% of the salary cap in the
NBA, and 54–57% percent in the NHL), in practice, most teams spend to
the limit of the salary cap.
The Union of European Football Associations announced in May 2011
that it intended to unilaterally implement a salary cap, becoming the first
European sports league to do so.287 The main purpose of the salary cap is
to place all teams on equal financial footing and prevent the highest revenue teams in the biggest cities from signing the best players. Cycling,
too, would benefit from a salary cap which would help ensure that the
wealthiest teams cannot hoard the best riders and effectively bankrupt
poorer teams.
A salary cap would put all cycling teams in a more equal financial setting while also providing teams and sponsors with better expectations
about the present and future costs of cycling. Riders should also favor a
salary cap similar to the ones used in the United States. While it may restrict salaries, a cap can stabilize teams and guarantee the riders a portion
of cycling revenues. By guaranteeing the riders a portion of team income, it creates a valuable partnership between the riders and the teams.
Both parties will have every incentive to increase revenues in the
sport.288
A negotiated salary cap in cycling should be exempt from scrutiny pursuant to the EC non-statutory labor exemption. Such a salary cap would
easily satisfy the first three elements of the EC non-statutory labor exHockey Related Revenues). It is important to point out that each league calculates and
includes different revenue sources in the fund of revenues ultimately divided amongst the
players. For example, in the NFL CBA, 10% of TR is deducted before calculating the
salary cap. NFL CBA, supra note 114, art. XXIV, § 1(a)(xiv)(1)(A), at 92.
286. NFL CBA, supra note 114, art. XXIV, § 3, at 95; NBA CBA, supra note 114, art.
VII, § 2(b)(1) at 122 (setting minimum at 75% of the salary cap); NHL CBA, supra note
114, art. 50, § 50.5, at 198–218 (establishing $16 million range in permissible payroll
range).
287. David Zaring, Can American Soccer Fans Bring Antitrust Claims Against European Football For Financial Fair Play?, CONGLOMERATE (May 25, 2011),
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/05/can-american-soccer-fans-bring-antitrustclaims-against-european-football-for-financial-fair-play.html.
288. In reality, the riders and teams must recognize that doping for short-term gains
and wins only ends up costing them money in the long-run as the sport loses credibility
and sponsors. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
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emption: (1) the existence of a CBA between management and labor; (2)
that the CBA was reached in good faith; and (3) that the CBA affects
core subjects of collective bargaining.289 The fourth element—that the
CBA does not directly affect third markets and third parties—is less
clear. A salary cap could affect those that are not a party to the CBA,
such as not-yet-professional cyclists, by depressing the salaries they
could earn upon their entry into the professional realm. However, the
salary cap is not designed for that purpose and the harm to these young
cyclists should not be considered direct.
All Big Four leagues have a degree of revenue sharing. All the leagues
equally divide the revenues from the national television contracts but
have varying policies concerning gate receipts and local revenues. Again,
cycling teams lack substantial revenue streams because they do not host
events. Nevertheless, if teams work collaboratively to increase revenues,
they should consider ways in which to share revenues in an effort to provide stability to teams and the sport. If teams were more financially stable and proactive, it is not inconceivable that they could obtain an equity
interest in cycling events so as to procure more revenues.
A salary cap or revenue sharing arrangement could help provide financial stability to the teams by allowing them to appreciate in value over
time. Unfortunately, the AIGCP performs almost none of the roles that
the NFL serves for its member teams, notably negotiating television and
licensing agreements and negotiating a CBA with the players. The NFL
generates tremendous revenue and provides important stability to the
league and its member teams by performing these and other tasks for the
teams. The AIGCP should serve as a centralized resource for its teams to
share best practices and provide guidance and oversight in the sport. The
AIGCP instead relinquishes its legal authority to control and influence
the sport to the UCI.
B. Change the Transfer Period
Presently, even though rider contracts run concurrent to calendar years,
riders and teams are permitted to begin negotiating a contract during the
current season for the following year beginning August 1.290 In American
sports, contracts expire during the offseason, at which point teams may
negotiate with the players. The August 1 date most likely exists for practical reasons as it is right after the Tour de France in July, during which
all the interested parties in the world of cycling are together in one place,

289. See supra text accompanying notes 255–61.
290. UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28, ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.120(a), at 106.
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including riders, teams, and sponsors.291 As a result, there are many high
profile contracts announced between riders and their new teams in early
August.
However, these changes are announced just weeks before the Vuelta a
España, one of cycling’s three Grand Tours and biggest events. The
change of a rider from his existing team to another team for the following season generally means that rider will not be participating in that
year’s Vuelta. For example, Alberto Contador announced in early August
2010 that he was leaving Astana for Saxo Bank-SunGard. Consequently,
Contador did not compete for Astana at the 2010 Vuelta even though it is
a race he won in 2008. This current timing is detrimental.
The transfer period should begin in late September, at the earliest, to
allow for the completion of the Vuelta. While many years ago it may
have been practical to negotiate while at the Tour de France, the highly
connected world of smartphones, email, and text messages, enables negotiations from a distance. Alternatively, negotiations could occur at the
Vuelta. In addition, transfer payments are not permitted in cycling and
teams do not trade riders further showing the lack of a legitimate need
for the current transfer date.
Moving the transfer period until after the Vuelta should spark greater
interest in the Vuleta as sponsors, team personnel, and typically nonparticipating riders might feel compelled to attend on the cusp of the
transfer period. Moreover, fans may become more interested as transfer
rumors heat up around the event or more successful riders choose to participate in the Vuelta. There is no realistic danger of stealing any of the
Tour de France’s spotlight, whose history and prestige carries the sport.
Teams also need to negotiate with potential sponsors for the following
year. Starting the transfer period six weeks later should not seriously
hinder this process. Furthermore, a sponsor’s willingness to cut the check
is obviously tied to the success of the team and the riders on the team.
For example, again, Saxo Bank decided to remain a sponsor of Riis Cycling only after Riis was able to sign Alberto Contador. However, sponsors do not presently consider association with the Vuelta to be a major
291. Interview with John Wilcockson, supra note 69; see, e.g., The Tour 2011, LE
TOUR DE FRANCE, http://www.letour.fr/2011/TDF/COURSE/us/le_parcours.html (last
visited Oct. 2, 2011) (stating that the 2011 Tour de France began July 2 and ended July
TOUR
DE
FRANCE,
24);
The
Tour
2010,
LE
http://www.letour.fr/2010/TDF/COURSE/us/le_parcours.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2011)
(stating that 2010 Tour de France began July 3 and ended July 25); The Tour 2009, LE
TOUR DE FRANCE, http://www.letour.fr/2009/TDF/COURSE/us/le_parcours.html (last
visited Oct. 2, 2011) (stating that the 2009 Tour de France began on July 4 and ended on
July 26).
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factor since most sponsorship decisions are made before the race. If the
transfer period, and consequently the sponsorship negotiation period, was
delayed until after the Vuelta, the Vuelta may be considered a more important event and its results could be more appropriately considered in
sponsorship deals.
The sport of cycling ultimately revolves around the Tour de France.
However, the current transfer period undermines one of its three most
important events. Moving the date until after the Vuelta a España would
allow the Vuelta to grow in importance and prestige creating a more balanced schedule that grabs and holds fan attention.
C. Increase the Creativity in Contractual Provisions
EC law regards the free movement of workers to be a fundamental
right that cannot be compromised, even through collective bargaining.292
Consequently, a reserve system such as those used in the Big Four,
whereby a team controls an athlete’s rights for the first few years of an
athlete’s career, would not be legal under EC law. Nevertheless, rider
continuity is important to the stability of the sport from a team, sponsor,
or fan perspective. Furthermore, there are other ways in which teams can
control rider movement as part of a CBA with the CPA.
In the NFL, unlike MLB, the NBA, or the NHL, contracts are not
guaranteed. A player’s contract can be terminated if the player engages
in activities other than the contracted professional sport that may involve
a significant risk of personal injury.293 Even when players are injured in
the sport that they play professionally, they are often released and go
through an injury grievance process to determine their appropriate compensation.294 Accordingly, the major issue in NFL contract negotiations
is the portion of money to be “guaranteed.”295 Contracts or bonuses can
be guaranteed against termination in the event of injury, diminished skill,
or a salary cap charge that is too large for the team.296 While the team can
still cut the player, the player will still be paid if certain portions of his
contract were guaranteed.297
The length of an NFL contract is superficial as a result of its mostly
non-guaranteed nature. Although a player may sign a six-year deal, due
292. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-04921, ¶ 92.
293. NFL CBA, supra note 114, art. XIV, § 7, app. C, at 248–56.
294. See id. art. X, at 28–33.
295. Deubert & Wong, supra note 116, at 200.
296. Id.
297. Id. About 50% of compensation in the NFL is guaranteed. See, e.g., 2010 NFL
Draft Rookie Signing Status, BACKSEAT FAN BLOG (July 29, 2011, 8:00 PM),
http://backseatfan.com/2010/04/2010-nfl-draft-rookie-signing-status.
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to the high injury rate and rapid turnover in talent, the chances of the
player actually completing the contract are not great. To offset the risk,
most contracts have incentive and bonus provisions that reward the player financially if he performs well.298 The sport of cycling should use similar contract structures.
Cycling teams generally sign riders to one or two-year contracts as anything longer would be a financial commitment that most teams cannot
make alongside their one or two year sponsorship deals. Through nonguaranteed contracts that provide an upside to the riders in the case of
good performance, teams could control riders for longer durations. Riders’ careers are short and their desperation for employment is what has
already caused them to allow the UCI to control the sport in place of a
CBA. Therefore, riders are unlikely to complain very long or loud about
a change in the structure of their contracts. Nevertheless, this change can
and should be negotiated in a CBA with the CPA.
In a related contractual issue, UCI rules prohibit contract negotiations
between a team and a rider except for during the specified transfer period.299 However, it is quite clear that these rules are not enforced. Prior to
the 2010 season, Bradley Wiggins left the Garmin-Slipstream team for
the new Team Sky based in his native England. Team Sky made known
their desire for the British Wiggins to lead their new team amidst his surprise fourth place overall performance at the Tour de France.300 However, Wiggins was still under contract to Garmin-Slipstream for one more
year.
The UCI failed to enforce its pseudo non-tampering provision and
Garmin-Slipstream considered litigation to prevent Sky’s poaching of
Wiggins.301 Ultimately, Team Sky reached a financial settlement with
Garmin-Slipstream and Wiggins signed a four-year deal with the financially robust Team Sky.302 However, the UCI’s failure to have and en-

298. See id. at 189–90.
299. UCI Regulations, Part II, supra note 28, ch. XV, § 4, art. 2.15.120(b), at 107.
300. Richard Moore, Team Sky Assemble Tour Squad with Bradley Wiggins on their
Mind, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 8, 2009, at 5; Alasdair Fotheringham, We Will Not Let
Wiggins Join British Team Sky, Says Garmin Manager, INDEP. (Aug. 20, 2009),
http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/general/others/cycling-we-will-not-let-wiggins-joinbritish-team-sky-says-garmin-manager-1774427.html (U.K.).
301. Matthew Pace, Counsel, Herrick Feinstein LLP, Panelist at the 14th Annual Fordham Sports Law Symposium (Mar. 26, 2010) (panel attended by author); see generally
Moore, Team Sky Assemble Tour Squad With Bradley Wiggins On Their Mind, supra
note 300.
302. John Henderson, CYCLING Boulder-Based Cycling Team Set to Go Without
Wiggins, DENVER POST, Dec. 26, 2009, at C.3; Daniel Benson & Richard Tyler, Bradley
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force an effective non-tampering provision hurt the stability of the sport
and caused dissension among the teams.
D. Revenue Generation
There are other business operation improvements that professional cycling would benefit from implementing, beyond those made through a
CBA. Most notably, certain changes could enable higher television revenues. Television broadcast revenues are among the most important and
lucrative sources of revenue in American sports.303 For this to be the
case, the Sports Broadcasting Act provides the Big Four leagues an important exemption from antitrust laws. This exemption permits individual
teams and potential competitors to pool their rights and sell them collectively. If professional cycling had a more American structure whereby
the league and the events existed only as a function of the individual
teams, it too would possibly need some type of exemption from antitrust
or competition law.
However, as detailed throughout this Article, the teams do not create or
control the events—the UCI and event organizers, such as ASO, do.
Since ASO is a single entity, it can and does collectively sell the rights to
many of its events. For example, in 2010 Versus broadcast eight of
ASO’s fourteen professional cycling events.304 ASO is able to leverage
the importance of broadcasting the Tour de France into forcing Versus or
Wiggins
Signs
with
Team
Sky,
CYCLINGNEWS
(Dec.
10,
2010),
http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/bradley-wiggins-signs-with-team-sky.
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broadcasters in other countries to broadcast ASO’s lesser known events.
It is the failure of the UCI to do something similar which continues to
deprive the UCI of meaningful revenues.
Most of the events on the UCI WorldTour are organized by separate,
individual entities. Consequently, these individual entities cannot collectively combine to sell the television rights to their events without violating EC antitrust law. The individual race organizers are effectively the
same as the thirty-two separate NFL teams in that they each possess valuable rights to an event. The Sports Broadcasting Act provides Big Four
sports teams the important ability to sell the television rights to their
events collectively. Television networks are far more interested—and
pay far more—to broadcast games for the entire league and concomitant
sponsorship rather than just a few teams. The consistent message that a
certain television network is the exclusive broadcaster for a certain
league’s games is valuable and provides valuable national exposure for
sponsors. Legislation similar to the Sports Broadcasting Act would likewise be necessary in the EC. While the EC takes a hard-line on antitrust
issues, they also take a hard-line on doping in sports. EC legislators and
regulators would have to recognize that legislation similar to the Sports
Broadcasting Act would provide important financial stability to the sport
of cycling—which could help reduce the doping scandals.
In addition, the UCI should look to purchase and control more events.
The events would provide the UCI with a valuable source of revenue
and, if they controlled enough major events, they could then sell them
collectively without running afoul of antitrust laws. The ASO derives
substantial revenue from its ability to collectively sell the television
rights to its events. If the UCI could do the same, it could gain leverage
against the ASO and make the UCI WorldTour a more legitimate and
sustainable enterprise.
CONCLUSION
Cycling is one of the world’s favorite sports. It has withstood countless
scandals questioning the legitimacy of its champions and races. Nevertheless, those scandals continue to cast a dark shadow over the sport’s
governance and sustainability. The stability and sustainability of the
sport of cycling continues to be threatened by the sport’s antiquated systems which have placed nearly all of the power in the hands of event organizers, rather than the teams and riders. American sports have been
largely successful in creating a shared and lucrative partnership between
teams and athletes through the collective bargaining process. Cycling
teams and cyclists need to do the same. By adopting some of the Ameri-
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can approaches to professional sports, cycling could take steps towards a
cleaner and more stable sport.

